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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant Taylor National, Inc., which was the plaintiff 
below, brought an action in the District Court for Utah County 
to recover a real estate sales commission from Defendant-
Respondent Jensen Brothers Construction Co. Jensen Brothers 
filed a counterclaim seeking to have the alleged real estate 
listing agreement declared void or, in the alternative, to 
recover damages from Taylor National for its breach. In a 
third-party complaint, Jensen Brothers sought to recover the 
amount of the commission from the purchaser of the real estate, 
Leon Harward. Harward, in return, sought rescission or re-
formation of the contract of sale of the property and damages 
from Taylor National and Jensen Brothers resulting from fraud 
in the sale of the real estate, from breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability, and for breach of the contract of 
sale. Harward, who was third-party-plaintiff and defendant 
below is also an appellant here. The district court, Judge 
J. Robert Bullock, sitting without a jury, granted recovery to 
Taylor National through Jensen Brothers aqainst Harward. The 
court found no cause of action by Harward against Jensen 
Brothers or Taylor National, and granted Jensen Brothers leave 
to notice a trustee's sale of the property. Appellant Harward 
seeks from this Court an order reversing the verdict of the 
District Court, or in the alternative, an order granting a 
new trial. 
~2-
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Appellant Harward is the purchaser of property ref erred 
to hereafter as the Barrington House. Taylor National, Inc. 
is a real estate broker, alleging to hold a valid real estate 
listing agreement on the Barrinqton House, executed by the 
builder-vendor, Jensen Brothers Construction Co. The questions 
presented by the appeal are the following: 
1. Is the real estate broker, Taylor National, Inc., 
entitled to a real estate sales commission resulting from the 
sale of the Barrington House? 
2. If Taylor National, Inc. is entitled to a commission, 
is the purchaser of the Barrington House, Leon Harward, liable 
for payment of this commission either directly to Taylor 
National, Inc. or to Taylor National through any other party? 
3. Does the evidence establish the fact that Harward 
has proven a cause of action against Jensen Brothers Construc-
tion Co. for damages resulting from breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability in the construction of the Barrington 
House? 
4. Does the evidence establish that Harward has proven 
a cause of action against Jensen Brothers Construction Co. 
for damages resulting from fraud in failing to disclose that 
the subdivision improvemen~ in which the Barrington House is 
located had not been accepted by the City of Orem, and were 
substandard? 
-3-
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5. Is Jensen Brothers Construction Co. equitably 
estopped to deny that it agreed to take land from Harward in 
exchange for its equity in the Barrington House? 
6. Did the trial court err in failing to reform the 
contract between Harward and Jensen Brothers Construction Co. 
to reflect their agreement to trade land for Jensen Brothers' 
equity in the Barrington House? 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The following statute is involved in this proceeding: 
Utah Code Annotated, § 25-5-4: 
In the following cases 
unless such agreement, 
thereof, is in writinq 
charged therewith: 
* * * * * 
every agreement shall be void 
or some note or memorandum 
subscribed by the party to be 
* * * * * * {_5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the first months of 1977, Paul Taylor, then President 
of Taylor National, Inc., (Taylor National), contacted repre-
sentatives of Jensen Brothers Construction Co. (Jensen Bros.) 
to arrange for the construction of a home to be displayed in 
the Utah County Parade of Hornes. (Record at 11-13.) The 
agreement ultimately reached by the parties provided that 
Jensen Bros. would own the property and build the home, while 
-4-
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Taylor National would be the selling broker. (Record at 13-
14.) Taylor National's share of the profits upon the sale 
of the property would be provided for in a six percent real 
estate broker's commission. (Record at 13.) Jensen Bros. 
executed a real estate listing agreement on a form provided 
and prepared by Taylor National. (Exhibit 9, Record at 17-
18.) The Barrington House was listed at a selling price of 
$140,000.00 (Exhibit 9, Exhibit 19.) Because the listing 
agreement is not dated, it is impossible to determine when 
that listing agreement was executed. However, Marvin Jensen, 
who signed the writing on behalf of Jensen Brothers, kept the 
carbon copy of the agreement. (Exhibit 19.) His copy differs 
markedly from the writing relied upon by Taylor National. 
(Exhibit 9, Exhibit 19, Record at 18-20.) The writing was not 
signed by representatives of Taylor National until after it 
had filed this suit. (Record at 20-21.) 
During the home show, in August 1977, the home, known as 
the Barrington House, was manned by sales people from Taylor 
National. (Record at 22, 28-29.) During the period of the 
home show, Taylor National received no offers to purchase the 
Barrington House. (Record at 79.) However, after the show, 
it was presented with offers which were rejected by the seller. 
(Record at 30-32.) 
Early in September 1977, Leon Jensen of Jensen Bros. 
received a call from Harward in which he expressed an interest 
in buying the home. (Record at 98, 259.) Leon Jensen told 
-5-
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Harward that he would instruct Taylor National to contact 
him. (Record at 98-99.) He then phoned Paul Taylor of Tay-
lor National, gave Taylor Harward's telephone number, and 
asked him to contact Harward. (Record at 32,99.) Taylor 
attempted to call Harward once, but without success. He 
then left town for a ten-day trip to Hawaii. (Record at 32, 
33.) Because Leon Jensen was concerned when representatives 
of Taylor National had not contacted Harward, he called them 
approximately a week after his first call. (Record at 99.) 
At this time he again asked someone from Taylor National to 
contact Harward. (Record at 99.) After nothing came of the 
first two phone calls, Leon Jensen again called Taylor Nation-
al, but was told that Paul Taylor was in Hawaii. He asked to 
speak to Bryce Taylor, who was the sales manager, but was 
told that he was not in. He left his name with Taylor Nation-
al, but was not contacted again. (Record at 100.) While 
Paul Taylor was in Hawaii, no representative of Taylor 
National made any attempt to contact Harward. (Record at 90.) 
Due to his frustrations in failing to get Taylor 
National to contact Harward, and only after it was obvious 
to him that Taylor National would not help with the sale, 
Leon Jensen got together with Harward to arrange a sale. 
(Record at 102.) At this point, approximately three to four 
weeks had passed since Harward had first contacted Jensen. 
Upon Paul Taylor's return from Hawaii, Leon Jensen informed 
him that he had arranged a sale to Harward. (Record at 33, 34.) 
-6-
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Paul Taylor informed Jensen at that time that unless Harward, 
who was a real estate agent, contacted Taylor National for 
an arrangement on the commission, it would charge Jensen 
Bros. one hundred per cent of the commission. (Record at 34.) 
Representatives of Taylor National did not take part in the 
closing, and took the position that it was Harward's duty to 
contact them concerning the sale of the house and a split on 
the commission. (Record at 49-51, 59, 89, 91-93.) 
Jensen Bros. accepted a written offer for purchase from 
Leon Harward and his wife, Judith, on October 19, 1977. 
The closing took place on December 9, 1977. At that time, 
Jensen Bros. accepted net proceeds of $131,600.00. (Exhibit 
36.) This selling price was $8,400.00 lower than the asking 
price, a difference represented by the six per cent broker's 
commission. 
From the beginning of negotiations, it was proposed by 
Harward, and agreed to by Jensen Bros., that Jensen Bros. 
would accept a trade of equity in land for their equity in 
the Barrington House. This is evident from Harward's first 
proposed Earnest Money offer (Exhibit 60) , Letters from 
Jensen Bros. to the mortgage company prior to the closing, 
(Exhibit 37), and the American Horne Mortgage, Inc. Disclosure/ 
Settlement Statement (Exhibit 36). Furthermore, representa-
tives of Jensen Bros. travelled with Harward on numerous 
occasions to view various parcels of land both in Utah County 
and Salt Lake County. (Record at 265, 72, 297, 304, 388-89.) 
-7-
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Harward continued to show land to representatives of Jensen 
Bros. from October 1977 until the spring of 1979. (Record 
at 269-72, 388-89.) Jensen Bros. even entered into an Earnest 
Money Agreement on one of these parcels procured by Harward, 
(the Williamson 25 acres) , and a letter from Marvin Jensen to 
Leon Harward dated December 1, 1978 indicates that land 
would be acceptable in trade for equity in the Barrington 
House. (Exhibit 55.) At the December 9, 1977 closing, no 
written transaction had been consummated to effect a trade of 
equities, so Harward executed and delivered a trust deed note 
to Jensen Bros. in the amount of $45,600.00 with an accompany-
ing trust deed. (Exhibit 59.) Jensen Bros. later reneged 
on its agreement to trade equities and caused Security Title 
and Abstract Co., the trustee under the trust deed, to serve 
a "Notice of Default" on Harward around July 13, 1978. 
(Exhibit 63 .. ) 
When Harward first moved into the Barrington House, the 
subdivision in which it is located had not been approved or 
accepted by the Orem City Council. (Record at 226-27.) 
Because the gutters, sidewalks, and roads were not properly 
installed, they deteriorated sreatly, making it difficult 
to drive in and out of the subdivision at times. (Record 
at 254.) In addition to problems with the subdivision, the 
Barrington House began to settle after Harward moved into 
it. This caused large cracks to appear in the walls and the 
garage floor, the fireplace began to pull away from the wall, 
-8-
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and doors did not properly fit their frames. (Record at 
231-235, Exhibits 44A~44K.) None of these problems were 
disclosed to Harward before he moved into the Barrington 
House. (Record at 421.) As a result, the value of the Bar-
rington House was greatly depressed, and it became impossible 
to resell the house. 
This action was instituted around June 7, 1978 by Taylor 
National to recover its alleged commission on the sale of 
the Barrington House from Jensen Bros. Jensen Bros. coun-
terclaimed against Taylor National and filed a third-party 
claim against Harward on approximately July 20, 1978. 
Taylor National's Position at the Trial 
Taylor National took the position that it held a valid 
real estate listing agreement, signed by the party to be 
charged thereunder, and in writing. Taylor National claimed 
that it had proven its right to a real estate sales commission 
of $8,400.00 plus interest and attorney's fees. 
Jensen Brothers' Position at the Trial 
Jensen Bros. contended that Taylor National was not en-
titled to a commission because it failed to prove a valid 
contract of agency. The contract alleged by Taylor National 
was not signed by both parties according to its terms and 
it omitted material matters, such as the duration of the 
agreement. Furthermore, Taylor National had failed to use 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable efforts to procure a purchaser and had breached 
the contract by placing the property under the multiple 
listing service. 
Jensen Bros. took the position that Harward acted as 
a real estate agent when he purchased the Barrington House. 
As a result, Jensen Bros. paid him a commission rather than 
discounting the price of the house by the amount of the 
broker's commission. Jensen Bros. claimed that this suit 
was a fight between two realtors over a commission. Jensen 
Bros., having paid one commission, should not be held to pay 
another to Taylor National. 
Jensen Bros. contended that the evidence showed that it 
never agreed to accept land in exchange for its equity in 
the Barrington House. Consequently, the remedy of reforma-
tion of the contract of sale was not available to Harward be-
cause there had been no agreement of such nature on which the 
court could base a reformation. 
Finally, Jensen Bros. alleged that there was no evidence 
either of fraud or that the Barrington House was uninhabitable. 
If there was a duty on the part of Jensen Bros. at all, that 
duty was to build the home in a reasonably workmanlike manner. 
However, if there was no negligence on the part of the builder, 
Jensen Bros. alleged, then there was no duty to pay damages 
to the buyer. The only remedy available upon breach of the 
duty was rescission of the contract. 
-10-
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Harward's Position at the Trial 
Harward contended that Taylor National was not entitled 
to a commission because it had failed to prove a valid con-
tract of agency on which it could base a commission. Taylor 
National had further failed to meet its fiduciary duties to 
the seller and had abandoned its listing agreement. 
Harward contended that, as purchaser of the Barrington 
House, he was not acting as a real estate salesman, but as an 
individual purchasing property for his own use. For this 
reason, he was not liable for the broker's commission. Never-
theless, Harward tendered forty percent of the broker's com-
mission to Taylor National, but it was rejected. 
Harward contended that the evidence showed that Jensen 
Bros. had agreed to take land in exchange for its equity in 
the house from the very beginning of negotiations. Jensen 
Bros. was equitably estopped by its acts, statements, and other 
conduct to deny this. Harward contended that these facts 
were the basis for reforming the contract in accordance with 
the original agreement. 
Finally, Harward contended that the evidence demonstrated 
substantial and material defects in the Barrington House. He 
claimed damages resulting from the breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability and alleged that Jensen Bros. had 
committed fraud by failing to disclose the condition of the 
subdivision. Consequently, the value and marketability of 
-11-
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his home was greatly diminished, all to his injury. 
The Trial Court's Decision in this Case 
The trial court found as follows: 
1. Taylor National was entitled to $8,400 plus six 
percent interest, or the amount of its broker's commision. 
But judgment was limited in equity when the court prohibited 
execution of judgment against Jensen Bros. and specified 
that the judgment did not constitute a lien on the real pro-
perty owned by Jensen Bros. Instead, Taylor National was 
required to pursue the judgment in behalf of Jensen Bros. 
against Harward, Harrison, & Soule, dba Value Realty & Con-
tinental Value Realty. Proceeds from any recovery were to 
be applied toward Taylor National's judgment against Jensen 
Broso 
2. Jensen Bros. was awarded judgment in the amount of 
$8,400 plus six percent interest and attorney's fees against 
Harward, Harrison and Soule. 
3. No cause of action was shown in Jensen Bros.' 
counterclaim against Taylor National. 
4. No cause of action was found in Harward's counterclaim, 
crossclairn, and third-party complaint against Jensen Bros., 
Taylor National, and Paul Taylor. 
5. The Court found that the trust deed and trust deed 
note of October 28, 1977 evidencing indebtedness of $45,600.00, 
plus interest, were valid instruments enforceable by their 
-12-
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terms against Harward. The Court found the trust deed note 
in default and notice of default having been recorded on 
July 14, 1978, more than three months having elapsed since 
that time. The preliminary injunction previously issued 
against Jensen Bros. was terminated and removed, and Jensen 
Brose was free to instruct the trustee to notice a trustee's 
sale of the premises. 
6. Jensen Bros. was granted leave to file a supplemental 
complaint against Harward for any amounts owed on the bond 
after the trustee's sale, upon application to the court and 
notice to Merrill Harward. 
7. Jensen Bros. was given leave to seek a deficiency 
judgment against Harward upon supplemental complaint after 
damages were determined upon the trustee's sale of the premises. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THIS IS A CASE IN EQUITY, 
IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS A DUTY 
TO REVIEW THE FACTS, 
AS WELL AS THE LAW. 
Utah law provides that an appeal from the decision of a 
district court in an equitable action may be upon questions 
of both law and fact. 
-13-
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From all final judgments of the district courts, 
there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The appeal shall be upon the record made in the court 
below and under such regulations as may be provided 
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on ques-
tions of both law and fact: ... UTAH CONST. Art. VIII,§ 9. 
Like the Utah Constitution, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide for appellate review of both the law and facts in 
equitable actions. "In equity cases the appeal may be on 
questions of both law and fact." UTAH R. CIV. p. 7 2. 
The language of the Constitution has been interpreted 
to impose a duty upon the Supreme Court to review both the 
facts and the law in equity cases. Crockett v. Nish, 
147 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1944), Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 
1359 (Utah 1974). As the Court said in Mitchell, 
Under Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, 
it is both the duty and prerogative of this court in 
an equitable action to review the law and facts and 
make its own findings and substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial court. Mitchell v~ Mitchell, 
supra at 1360. 
In the present action, appellant Harward seeks reforma-
tion of a contract for the sale of land. This is an equitable 
action. 66 AM. JUR. 2d, Reformation of Instruments, §§ 1, 2 
(1979). Therefore, in accordance with Utah law, this Court 
has a duty to review both the law and facts in this case. 
Furthermore, the Court has a duty to overturn the findings of 
the trial court if they are found to be against the weight 
of the evidence. Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 99 utah 139, 
98 P.2d 695 (1940), McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996,997 
(Utah 1978), Olivero v. Eleganti, 214 P. 313, 315 (Utah 1923), 
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Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 
940' 943 (1962). 
II 
IN THIS SUIT FOR A BROKER'S COMMISSION, 
TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER AGAINST THE BUYER, LEON HARWARD 
Before he may recover in an action for a real estate 
sales commission, a broker must prove that he acted pursuant 
to an express contract of agency. Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 
243, 188 P. 640 (1920), Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 
P. 915 (Utah 1930), Olson v. Neale, 116 Ariz. 522, 570 P.2d 
209 (Ariz. App. 1977). The broker's right to a commission is 
measured by the terms of his contract. Watson v. Odell, 58 
Utah 276, 198 P. 772 {1921), Eastern Okla. Land & Cattle Co. 
v. Dorris, 549 P.2d 78 {Okla. 1976), Throm v. Reid, 534 P.2d 
330 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975), Firkins v. Affolter, 504 P.2d 365 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1972), Watson v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 
439 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1968), Ridgway v. Chase, 265 P.2d 603 
(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1954), Scott v. Huntzinger, 365 P.2d 
692 (Colo. 1961), Gleichenhaus v. Pratt, 190 Kan. 1, 372 P.2d 
273 (1962), Blank v. Borden, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31, 524 P.2d 127 
(1974), Dale v. Raines, 252 P.2d 22 (Dist~ Ct. App. Calif. 
1953), Ridgway v. Chase, 265 P.2d 603 (Dist. Ct. App. Calif. 
1954), Uhlrnann v. North Whittier Highlands, Inc., 334 P.2d 
1022 (1957), Ford v. Palisades Corp. 225 P.2d 545 (Dist. ct. 
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App. Calif. 1951), Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Horne, 145 P.2d 189 
(Okla. 1944), Denbo v. Weston Inv. Co., 245 P.2d 650 (Calif. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1952). Furthermore, the Utah Statute of 
Frauds requires that contract to be in writing. Smith Realty 
Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640. 
In the following cases 
unless such agreement, 
thereof, is in writing 
charged therewith: 
every agreement shall be void 
or some note or memorandum 
subscribed by the party to be 
* * * * * * * * * * * (5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4. 
As the Court said in Blank v. Borden, 
(A)ny right to compensation asserted by a real estate 
broker must be found within the four corners of his 
employment contract, ... In short it is the contract 
which governs the agent's compensation, and that contract 
is strictly enforced according to its lawful terms. 
Blank v. Borden, 524 P.2d at 129-30. 
Because he must rest his right to a commission on his 
contract of employment, a broker must look to his employer 
for compensation and cannot recover a commission from those 
who did not directly employ him. 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers 
§§ 163-4, 12 C.J.S. Brokers§ 82, 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency§ 247, 
C. Buck Bush Realty Co. v. Whetstone, 266 So.2d 135 (Miss~ 
1972). A broker can recover only in accordance with the terms 
of his employment. Ford v. Palisades Corp., 225 P.2d 545 
(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1951). This means that the seller, 
and not the buyer, is solely liable for the broker's commission. 
Moss v. Sperry, 191 So. 531 (Fla. 1939), Steinberg v. Buchman, 
167 P.2d 207 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1946), McDaniel v. McCauley 
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371 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1962) ,·Keyes Co.'v. I·sland Fbx Motel, Inc. 
260 So.2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Webster v. Hochberg, 
105 Ill. App .. 2d 466, 245 N .E. 2d 529 (1969) . 
Ordinarily, and in the absence of some understanding 
or agreement to the contrary, the vendor alone is 
liable for the payment of the commission due a broker 
employed by him to sell the property, or to find a 
purchaser ready, able, and willing to purchase, and the 
purchaser's only liability is to pay to the owner the 
agreed purchase price. Moss v. Sperry, 191 So. at 537. 
Therefore, before he can recover in an action for a real 
estate sales commission, the broker must show that there is 
a contractual relation between himself and the person aqainst 
whom he seeks to recover the commission. Chambers v. Shivers, 
497 P.2d 327 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972), Johns·v. Ambrose-Williams 
& Co., 136 Colo. 390, 317 P..2d 897 (1957). 
In the present case Taylor National bases its right to 
recover in this action on a writing purporting to be a real 
estate listing agreement, and introduced at the trial as 
Exhibit 9. (Record at 17, lines 27-30 to 18, lines 1-5.) 
Nowhere in that writing, however, is there evidence of a con-
tractual relationship between Taylor National and Leon Harward, 
the buyer. If a contract exists at all, it is between Taylor 
National and Jensen Brothers. Harward was not a party to 
the writina on which Taylor National bases its right to a 
commission, and Taylor National may not recover a real estate 
sales commission from him, which the AMended Judqment of 
April 15, 1980 purports to allow. 
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Taylor National has neither alleged nor proven a contract 
granting it the right to recover against Harward for the sale 
of the Barrington House -- Harward was the purchaser of the 
house, and was not Taylor National's employer. Taylor 
National's right to a recovery rests against Jensen Brothers, 
if it rests against anyone. 
While Harward is a real estate broker by profession, he 
purchased the Barrington House for use as his own personal 
residence. He was acting as a buyer, not a broker, when he 
contacted Jensen Bros., and he represented no party other 
than himself. In other words, he was a buyer just like any 
other. Because Harward was a broker, and could handle the 
closing of the sale on his own, Jensen Bros. was willing to 
reduce the price of sale on the home by the amount of the 
commission it normally would have paid had it been represented 
by a broker. And, as the owner of the house, Jensen Bros. 
was free to sell the home for any price it saw fit. 
There are no known cases denying a broker the rights 
enjoyed by other buyers in general solely on the basis of 
his eMployment as a real estate broker. Rather, the cases 
indicate that a broker purchasing property for himself does 
not act as broker. In Blocklinger V.'Schlegel, 58 Ill. App. 
3d 324, 374 N.E. 2d 491 (1978), a real estate broker who had 
purchased property for hirnself brought suit for specific 
performance of the real estate sales contract. The court 
found that there was no fiduciary duty between the broker-
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purchaser and the sellers, nor was there contractual privity 
resulting from a multiple listing agreement which the sellers 
had entered into with their real tor which required the real tor 
to relist the property with other members of the county board 
of realtors listing service. The court observed: 
In Fish v. Teninga, (1928) 330 Ill. 160, 161 N.E. 515, 
it was quite properly stated that the business of being 
a realtor is not one containing an element of public 
interest so as to require him to deal as a fiduciary 
with everyone. Before a fiduciary duty arises it must 
be proven that a realtor has been employed by someone 
and that he is therefore an agent for them. Blocklinger 
v. Schlegel, 374 N.E. 2d at 493. 
In Case v. Business Centers, Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 267, 
357 N.E. 2d 47 (.1976), the sellers sued a broker-buyer for 
breach of fiduciary duty. In denying recovery against the 
buyer, the court held that a broker~buyer which purchased pro-
perty for its own use through the seller•s broker was under 
no duty to disclose to the sellers that it had obtained a 
portion of the sales commission under an agreement with the 
listing broker. In other words, the broker-buyer owed no 
fiduciary duty to the seller when the seller did not employ 
him. The broker had the same rights in purchasing property 
for himself as does the public in general. 
In purchasing property for himself, a broker is entitled 
to contract freely with the seller just as other buyers do. 
And, as with buyers in general, the broker who purchases pro-
perty for himself does not become liable to the owner's 
broker for a commission. The law places all liability for 
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payment of such a commission on the owner. Steinberg v. 
Buchman, 167 P.2d 207, Keyes Co. v. Island Fox Motel, Inc., 
260 So.2d 894, Moss v. Sperry, 191 So. 531, Webster v. Hochberg, 
245 N.E. 2d 529, McDaniel v. ~cCauley, 371 P.2d 486, 12 AM. 
JUR. 2d Brokers §§ 163-4, 12 C.JeS. Brokers § 82, 3 AM. JUR. 
2d Agency§ 247. If a commission is due Taylor National on 
the sale of the Barrinqton House, it must look solely to 
Jensen Bros. for its recovery. 
In purchasing the Barrington House, Harward did not 
subject himself to liability for Taylor National's commission 
in any other way. In early September 1977 Harward contacted 
a representative of the owner, Leon Jensen, when he became 
interested in the house. (Record at 32, lines 17-19; 98, 
lines 8~20.) He was told by Leon Jensen that Jensen Bros.' 
broker would contact him about arranging negotiations. (Record 
at 98, lines 16~20~ 261, lines 9~13.) Leon Jensen then made 
repeated attempts to have the broker, Taylor National, con-
tact Harward. It failed to do so. Instead, Taylor National's 
president left town for a ten day visit to Hawaii, no other 
representative of Taylor National contacted Harward, (Record 
at 90), and Taylor National ultimately took the position that 
Harward would have to contact Taylor National to arrange a 
purchase. (Record at 49-51, 59, 89, 91-93.) Only after Jensen 
Bros. became frustrated over Taylor National's refusal to 
contact Harward did Jensen Bros. and Harward begin to talk 
together about the actual terms for the purchase of the 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Barrington House~ (Record at 100, lines 13-23~ 263, lines 
8-18.) This was 3 weeks to a month after Jensen Bros. had 
first requested Taylor National to contact Harward! 
at 33, line 8; 88, lines 10-27; 263, lines 19-22.) 
(Record 
As the buyer, Harward had no legal duty to contact the 
listing broker. Rather, as shall he established hereafter, 
it was Taylor National's duty to contact the prospective 
purchaser. It failed to do so. Any right to a commission 
asserted by Taylor National must be asserted against Jensen 
Brothers, and the judgment of the lower court granting 
Taylor National the right to recover the amount of its 
broker's fees through Jensen Bros. and against Harward, 
Harrison, and Soule should be reversed. 
III 
TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
A COMMISSION RESULTING FROM THE SALE OF 
THE BARRINGTON HOUSE 
A. TAYLOR NATIONAL HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT IT IS 
ENTITLED TO A REAL ESTATE SALES COMMISSION. 
In an action for the recovery of a real estate sales 
commission, the burden of proving that he is entitled to a 
commission rests with the real estate broker. 12 AM. JUR. 2d 
Brokers § 248 (1979). To sustain this burden, the broker 
must first prove that he was authorized to act as the agent 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for the seller. Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1960), 
Pattee v. Moody, 166 Kan. 198, 199 P.2d 798 (1948), 12 AM. 
JUR. 2d Brokers § 248, 12 C.J.S. Brokers ~ 15 (1979). And he 
can do so only by proving the extistence of an express con-
tract of agency. Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915 
(Utah 1930), Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640 (1920), 
Gleichenhaus v. Pratt, 190 Kan. 1, 372 Po2d 273 {1962). In 
addition, the broker must prove that he acted pursuant to 
the contract, and that it was not entered into after his per-
formance . 
... {I)t is not enough to merely allege an agreement or 
promise to pay the broker for services already rendered 
whether made directly to the broker or to some third 
person, but before a broker can recover he must allege 
and prove an express contract of employment in pursuance 
of which services were rendered which entitle him to 
recover the commission agreed upon. Smith Realty Co. 
v. Dipietro, 292 P. at 917. 
In many jurisdictions, the broker has the additional burden 
of proving that the agency contract meets the requirements 
of the Statute of Frauds. Beazell v. Schrader, 59 Cal. 2d 
577, 30 Cal. Rptr. 534, 381 P.2d 390 (1963), Reilly v. Maw, 
146 Mont. 145, 405 P.2d 440 (1965), Record Realty, Inc. v. 
Hull, 15 Wash. App. 826, 552 P.2d 191 {1976), 12 CcJ.S. 
Brokers § 15. In Utah, however, where an express contract 
is alleged, it will be ''presumed to be in writing until the 
contrary is made to appear." Case v. Ralph, 188 P. at 643. 
Once he has proven an express contract of agency, the 
broker must show the performance of his undertaking. Porter 
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v. Hunter, 207 P. 153 (Utah 1922), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers 
§ 248. He must prove that he acted in accordance with the 
terms of his contract. Patterson v. Blair, 257 P.2d 944 
(Utah 1953). The broker cannot recover a commission as a 
volunteer~ he must show a contract of agency broad enough to 
cover the particular transaction on which he seeks to base 
his commission. Gleichenhaus v. Pratt, 372 P.2d 273, 12 C.J.S. 
Brokers § 60. 
To recover a comm1ss1on, then, the broker must prove 
that he has fulfilled all the conditions precedent to the 
duty of the seller to pay. Record Realty, Inc. v. Hull, 
552 P.2d 191. Ordinarily, this means that the broker is 
required to prove that he produced a buyer who was ready, 
willing and able to purchase on terms acceptable to the seller. 
Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1960), Campbell v. 
Fowler, 214 Kan. 491, 520 P.2d 1285 (1974), Winkelman v. 
Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974), Record Realty v. 
Hull, 552 P.2d 191. And he must prove further that he was 
the efficient, or procuring, cause of the sale. Link v. 
Patrick, 367 P.2d 157 (Alaska 1961), Campbell v. Fowler, 214 
Kan. 491, 520 P.2d 1285 (1974), Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 
1377, Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105, Hiniqer v. Judy, 194 
Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305 (1965), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 248. 
Before a real estate broker is entitled to a commission 
it is necessary for him to establish not only that he 
was authorized to act as defendant's agent, but also 
that he produced a purchaser ready, willing and able 
to buy on the terms prescribed by the owner, and that 
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he was the efficient agent or procuring cause of the 
sale. Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d at 107. 
The broker must sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 248, C.J.S. Brokers 
§ 15. 
In this action, Taylor National seeks recovery of a real 
estate sales commission. (Record at 17, lines 19-30 to 18, 
lines 1-5.) In order to recover that commission, however, 
Taylor National must prove that it was authorized to act as 
agent for the seller, Jensen Brothers Construction Co., 
Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105, Pattee v. Moody, 199 P.2d 
798, under an express contract of agency. Smith Realty Co. 
v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640.. Gleichen-
haus v. Pratt, 372 P.2d 273. Taylor National must further 
prove that the actions which entitle it to a commission were 
performed pursuant to that contract, and that the contract was 
entered into before the commission was due. Smith Realty Co. 
v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915. It must prove that its actions were 
in accordance with the terms of the contract. Record Realty, 
Inc. v. Hull, 552 P.2d 191. Taylor National must further 
prove, absent a contract to the contrary, that it produced a 
buyer who was ready, willing and able to purchase on terms 
acceptable to the seller, Link v. Patrick, 367 P.2d 157, 
Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105, Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 
1377, Hiniger v. Judy, 398 P.2d 305, Campbell v. Fowler, 
520 P.2d 1285. Taylor National has not sustained this burden 
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by the required preponderance of the evidence, as will be 
demonstrated hereafter. 
B. TAYLOR NATIONAL HAS NOT PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF AN 
EXPRESS CONTRACT OF AGENCY ON WHICH A BROKER IS 
REQUIRED TO BASE HIS COMMISSION. 
1. THE LISTING AGREEMENT INTRODUCED AT THE TRIAL 
AS EXHIBIT 19 CONTAINS THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
OF THE OFFER MADE BY JENSEN BROTHERS TO TAYLOR 
NATIONAL. 
Before he may recover in an action for a real estate 
sales commission, a broker must prove that he acted pursuant 
to an express contract of agency. (For citations, see p.4.) 
The broker's right to a commission is measured by the terms 
of his contract. (For citations, see p. 4.) And that con-
tract must be in writing. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4, Smith 
Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640. 
Taylor National has failed to carry its burden of 
proving the existence of a valid contract of agency entitling 
it to recover a commission upon the sale of the Barrington 
House. It bases its right to a recovery in this action on a 
writing introduced at the trial as Exhibit 9. (Record at 17, 
lines 27-30 to 18, lines 1-5.) This instrument, however, 
does not represent the terms offered to Taylor National by 
Jensen Brothers Construction Co. 
The offer made by Jensen Bros. is more accurately reflected 
in the listing agreement introduced at the trial as Exhibit 
19. Exhibit 19 is the carbon copy which was attached to 
Exhibit 9 when Marvin Jensen signed it on behalf of Jensen 
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Bros. The circumstances surrounding the preparation of the 
listing agreement and Marvin Jensen's signing it were ex-
plained at the trial by Paul Taylor, formerly President of 
Taylor National, as follows: 
Q Okay. And I'll show you Exhibit Nine and ask you if 
you can identify that? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What is that? 
A That's a Utah County Board of Realtor's form for 
single residential listing. 
Q And is that the Listing Agreement under which you 
claim a real estate commission? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Now, do you -- strike that. Tell the Court the 
circumstances under which that was executed and how 
it came to your possession. 
A The Listing Agreement was prepared in writing in the 
presence of the Jensen Brothers. We felt that we 
wanted to have it typed. So we took it back to our 
office and had our secretary type it. 
Q You wrote it out in pencil first? 
A Right. 
Q Okay. Then went back to your office and had your 
secretary type it? 
A Right. 
Q Then what haopened? 
A Then we delivered it to the Jensen Brothers for 
their signature. And either the Jensen Brothers 
delivered the final executed copy to us, or someone 
from our staff picked it up. I'm not sure of which. 
(Record at 17, lines 27~30 to 18, lines 1-22.) 
After signing the instrument, Marvin Jensen returned the top 
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copy and kept the carbon, Exhibit 19. (Record at 129, lines 
21-29.) Since Exhibit 19 is a carbon of the writing signed 
by Marvin Jensen, the impressions of any handwritten nota-
tions made on the top copy (Exhibit 9) should show through on 
the carbon 
separated. 
unless they were added after the copies were 
But there are handwritten notations on Taylor National's 
copy, (Exhibit 9), which do not appear on the carbon (Exhibit 
19). On the top of the page the words "Not on multiple" and 
"Office Exclusive" have been added to Exhibit 9. In addition, 
the blank next to the "Date Listed" has been filled in with 
either the numbers "6-1-77" or "7-1-77." And the blank next 
to the "Date Expired" has been filled in with the numbers 
"12-1-77." Under the blank for "salesman" the names "Bryce 
& Paul Taylor" have been added. Finally, it was stipulated 
by counsel for Taylor National at trial that the writing had 
been signed at the bottom by a representative of Taylor 
National after this suit was filed. (Record at 20-21). Be-
cause these handwritten terms are not present on the carbon 
copy, (Exhibit 19), it may be inferred that they were not 
present on the writing when Marvin Jensen signed it. But, 
in addition, Paul Taylor testified that at least one of the 
terms was added by a secretary at Taylor National, (Record 
at 18, lines 23-27, 19, lines 15-18), and he presumed that 
other additions were made by the secretary also. (Record 
at 19, lines 3-5). Since Taylor National wanted to have the 
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document typed before Jensen Bros. signed it, it is not likely 
that the secretary would fill in most of the blanks with the 
typewriter and then fill in the others by hand before de-
livering the instrument to Jensen Bros. After all, Taylor 
National did not want a handwritten listing agreement; 
that was the reason for having it typed in the first place. 
(Record at 18, lines 9-11.) 
The handwritten additions which appear only on Exhibit 
9 were added after Marvin Jensen returned the writing to 
Taylor National. Exhibit 9, therefore, does not reflect the 
terms and conditions of the offer made by Jensen Bros. to 
Taylor National. Those terms and conditions are set forth 
in Exhibit 19. And Exhibit 19 is the contract on which Taylor 
National must rest its right to a commission. 
This fact has ramifications which prevent Taylor National 
from claiming a commission in this action. For an addition 
of a term to an instrument, such as here alleged, may consti-
tute a material alteration. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1902. 
And "{t)he intentional or material alteration of a written 
contract, by a party entitled to any benefit under it destroys 
the integrity of the instrument and extinguishes all executory 
obligations of the contract in his favor." Bishop v. Rain-
holdt, 79 Cal. App. 2d 568, 180 P.2d 416, 419 (Calif. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1947)' WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS ~ 1902. The test of 
materiality is whether the instrument will have the same 
legal effect after the alteration as it did before. WILLISTON 
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ON CONTRACTS§ 1902, Briggs v. Sarkeys, Inc., 418 P.2d 620, 
624 (Okla. 1966). 
In the present case, the additions are material --
especially the additions of the listing and expiration dates 
of the contract. For these dates define the time for per-
formance of the contract. They establish the duration of 
Jensen Brothers' liability to Taylor National for a commission 
on the sale of the house and set the date upon which Jensen 
Bros. is free to sell the property without liability to 
Taylor National. Without an expiration date, a listing agree-
ment lasts, at most, for a reasonable time. The addition of 
the expiration date to the writing, however, may cause the 
agreement to endure for more than a reasonable time. This 
makes all the difference to Taylor National if a sale of the 
property is made after a reasonable amount of time has 
elapsed, but before the expiration date which was added to 
the writing. Were the expiration date not added to the 
writing, Taylor National would not be entitled to a commis-
sion. Without that expiration date specified in the writing, 
the passage of a reasonable time for performance does not 
operate to deny Taylor National its commission. 
A listing agreement which does not contain a listing 
date and an expiration date lacks the definite terms necessary 
to create a contract. Without those terms, the writing is 
so vague that it cannot be enforced. When those dates are 
present on a listing agreement, it is apparent that the parties 
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came to a meeting of the minds over the time for performance. 
In the present case, the additions of the terms "Office 
Exclusive" and "Not on multiple" create ambiguities in the 
contract which affect the broker's right to a commission. 
For, as discussed later, a broker's listing agreement must 
grant an exclusive agency or an exclusive right to sell 
unambiguously within the four corners of the writing. Foltz 
v. Begnoche, 222 Kan. 383, 565 P.2d 592 (1977). Wilkins v. W.B. 
Tilton Real Estate and Ins., Inc., 257 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1971). When the additions are read in connec-
tion with the terms of the listing agreement in the present 
case, it is difficult to ascertain whether the listing 
agreement grants an exclusive right to sell, an exclusive 
agency, or an open listing to Taylor National. Consequently, 
the additions materially alter the legal affect of the 
instrument. 
After Marvin Jensen signed the listing agreement on 
behalf of Jensen Bros., he returned it to Taylor National, 
who had possession of it until this suit was filed. The 
additions were made to the writing after it was delivered 
to Taylor National. Further, Paul Taylor stated his presump-
tion that the additions were made by the secretary to Taylor 
National. Because the alterations in the writing are material, 
and because the evidence establishes that employees of Taylor 
National made them, Taylor National is not entitled to re-
cover under the listing agreement introduced at trial as 
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Exhibit 9. All executory obligations in favor of Taylor 
National were extinguished by the alterations. 
There are further reasons for finding that Exhibit 19 
contained the terms and conditions which were offered by 
Jensen Bros. For the listing agreement specifies that, by 
signing, the owner acknowledges receipt of a copy of the 
agreement. {Exhibit 9, Exhibit 19e) In addition, Utah law 
imposes a duty on the broker to provide the owner with copies 
of all listings and agreements of sale contracts. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 61-2-11. Neither Leon nor Marvin Jensen ever saw 
Exhibit 9 after it was signed by Marvin Jensen. {Record at 
97,124, 130.) The only copy of the listing agreement which 
Jensen Bros. had was Exhibit 19. Therefore by the terms of 
the listing agreement which it prepared, Taylor National is 
estopped to deny that the copy of the listing which Jensen 
Bros. retained was a valid copy of the agreement. Any 
listing agreement which does not conform to the terms set out 
in Exhibit 19, therefore, is invalid. Because it differs 
in several material aspects from the offer made by Jensen 
Bros., Exhibit 9 May not be asserted by Taylor National 
as the contract of agency. 
2. TAYLOR NATIONAL FAILED TO ACCEPT THE OFFER MADE 
BY JENSEN BROS., CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO 
CONTRACT OF AGENCY ON WHICH TAYLOR NATIONAL 
MAY BASE A RIGHT TO A COM.MISSION. 
Before a contract can be said to exist, the parties must 
come to a meeting of the minds. Pinqree v. Continental Group 
of Utah. 558 P.2d 1317 {Utah 1976), Morgan v. Bd. of State 
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Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976), Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 
2d 83, 368, P.2d 597 (1962), Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 
61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961), E.B. Wicks v. Moyle, 137 P.2d 342 
(Utah 1943), Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101 (Utah 1926). 
Consequently, an acceptance containing terms which vary from 
those of the original off er does not lead to a binding con~ 
tract. Instead, it is said to be both a rejection of the 
original offer and a counteroffer. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. 
Co. v. Columbus Rolling-Mill Co., 119 U.S. 149 (1886), C.H. 
Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Assoc., Inc., 90 Ida. 502, 414 P.2d 
873 (1966), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 58. 
In the present case, Taylor National alleges a right 
to a commission based on the writing introduced as Exhibit 
9. (Record at 17-18.) As previously established, Exhibit 
9 does not contain the terms and conditions of the offer 
made by Jensen Bros. (Exhibit 19). Accordingly, the parties 
never came to a meeting of the minds and no contract can be 
said to exist. Taylor National's additions to the terms of 
the offer made by Jensen Bros. operated as both a rejection 
and a counteroffer to Jensen Bros.' offer. There is no 
evidence to indicate that Jensen Bros. ever accepted this 
counteroffer. In fact, representatives of Jensen Bros~ were 
not aware that changes had been made in the listing agree~ 
rnent until the time of the trial. (Record at 97, 124, 130.) 
Furthermore, because a broker must base his right to a com-
mission on a written contract, Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 
-32-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640, Taylor National may 
not claim a meeting of the minds to some contract other than 
Exhibit 9 or 19 which was not in writing. 
No contract ever came into being between Taylor National 
and Jensen Bros. because there was never a meeting of the 
minds between the two parties. Therefore, Taylor National 
may not recover in this action to collect a real estate 
sales commission because it has not proven the existence of 
a valid contract on which a broker is required to base his 
commission. 
Even if Exhibit 9 (Taylor National's copy of the listing 
agreement) were found to be a valid contract of agency, there 
would still be no contract because Taylor National failed to 
accept the offer made by Jensen Bros. Acceptance of an offer 
may be made in several different ways. 17 C.J.S. Contracts 
§ 41. And signing a document constitutes an acceptance of 
its provisions. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 41. "In case of doubt 
an offer is interpreted as inviting the cfEeree to accept 
either by promising to perform what the offer requests or 
by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses. RESTATE-
~~1ENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 31. 
In the present case there is little doubt as to the 
method of acceptance contemplated by Jensen Bros.' offer. 
The listing agreement provides a space for the signatures of 
both the listing owner and the broker. It requires each 
party to sign in consideration of the signature of the other 
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each party promises in consideration of the other party's 
promise, and a bilateral contract arises. This listing agree-
ment was provided by Taylor National, which did nothing to 
contradict the expectations raised by the instrument that 
each party would indicate its promise to be bound by its 
signature. As a result, Jensen Bros. expected Taylor National 
to indicate its assent to the terms of the instrument by 
signing it. (Record at 130, lines 17-20.) But Taylor 
National never gave its promise in exchange for the promise 
made by Jensen Bros. In the first place, Jensen Bros. was 
never given a copy of the listing agreement signed by Taylor 
National, and there is no evidence to indicate that Taylor 
National ever gave its promise to perform at any time prior 
to the beginning of this suit. In the second place, any 
attempted acceptance which Taylor National made by signing 
the listing agreement was ineffective because it was signed 
after the occurance of the event allegedly giving rise to 
a commission. 
Utah law does not prevent an owner and broker from enter~ 
ing into a special contract which provides for a broker's 
commission on the happening of a certain event. Watson v. 
Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772 (1921), Patterson,_2.. Blair, 
257 P.2d 944 (Utah 1953). And in this case, Taylor National 
does not allege that it procured the ultimate purchaser of 
the Barrington House, which is the ordinary method of earning 
a commission. Consequently, it must base its claim to a 
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commission on special terms in the listing agreement. 
Taylor National alleges that the event giving rise to its 
right to a commission is the sale by any party, of the 
Barrington House. The terms of the listing agreement provide: 
... if said property or any part thereof is sold, 
leased or exchanged during said term by myself or 
any other party, I agree to pay you a commission 
of 6% for such sale, lease or exchange. (Exhibits 
9 &-19, paragraph 2.) 
But Taylor National must prove that its contract was 
in force at the time that event occurred in order to be 
entitled to commission. Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 
915. In Smith Realty, the court indicated that a broker is 
not entitled to a commission on a contract entered into 
after the happening of the event. 
If, as indicated by Mr. Justice Frick in Case v. Ralph, 
Supra, it was there necessary to allege an express 
contract of employment, so here, the complaint to be 
sufficient must contain such an allegation. It 
follows that it is not enough to merely allege an 
agreement or promise to pay the broker for services 
already rendered whether made directly to the broker 
or to some third person, but before a broker can re-
cover he must allege and prove an express contract of 
employment in pursuance of which services were rendered 
which entitle him to recover the commission agreed 
upon. 292 P. at 917. (Emphasis added.) 
To be entitled to a commission on the sale of the Barring-
ton House, then, Taylor National must show that it accepted 
Jensen Bros.' offer before the sale of the house. It has 
not proven this fact. For the Barrington House was sold in 
late 1977, while Taylor National did not sign the listing 
agreement until after June 7, 1978. (Record at 20, lines 
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29-30 to 21, lines 1-3.) Taylor National entered into the 
contract of agency by signing the listing agreement after any 
right to a commission was due. Consequently, it may not 
recover in this action. Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro., 292 
P. 915. 
In any event, Taylor National's power of acceptance 
had been terminated before it accepted the listing agreement 
by signing it. For as shall be demonstrated hereafter, 
Jensen Bros.' offer had been revoked or had lapsed, having 
been extended for more than a reasonable time. And either of 
these occurances operate to terminate an offeree's power of 
acceptance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 35(1). 
Having failed to show that it accepted Jensen Bros.' 
offer by signing the contract, Taylor National must demon-
strate that it accepted by performing according to the terms 
of the offer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS ~ 31. Taylor 
National has failed to demonstrate this. 
Ordinarily, a broker's listing agreement, whether it 
grants the broker an exclusive right to sell, an exclusive 
agency, or merely an open listing, is viewed as an offer 
for a unilateral contract. Tetrick v. Sloan, 339 P.2d 613 
(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), Baumgartner v. Meek, 272 P.2d 
552 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1954), c. Forsman Real Estate Co. 
v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 547 P.2d 1116 (1976)' 12 AM. JUR. 2d 
Brokers § 32. This unilateral view of the agency contract 
is acknowledged by the Utah Statute of Frauds, which requires 
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only the signature of the owner on the writing. A writing 
is sufficient under the statute if it is "subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith." UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4. 
Acceptance of the unilateral offer made in a broker's 
listing agreement may be only by full performance. Barnard 
v. Hardy, 293 P. 12 (Utah 1930), Porter v. Hunter, 207 P. 
153 (Utah 1922), Clements v. Rankin, 189 P.2d 725 (Calif. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1948), C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 
547 P.2d 1116, Wilkins, v. Tilton, 257 So.2d 573 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1971), Craib v. Committee on National Missions, 62 
Mich. App. 617, 233 N.W. 2d 674 (1975). 
It is clear that a real estate broker's employment 
contract is usually a unilateral agreement which the 
broker may accept only by full performance. C. Forsman 
Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 547 P.2d at 1120. 
A broker is not entitled to compensation until he has 
performed the undertaking assumed by him. Roscow v. Bara, 
135 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1943). He must accomplish what he under-
took to do in his contract of employment -- nothing short of 
that will entitle him to compensation. Spartz v. Rimnac, 
208 N.W. 2d 764 (Minn. 1973), Libowitz v. Lake Nursing Home, 
Inc., 35' Wis. 2d 74, 150 N.W. 2d 439 (1967), Fenton v. Bancroft 
Hotel Assoc., Inc. 265 So. 2d 67. A broker is not entitled 
to compensation for unsuccessful efforts. Id~ Diehl & Assoc., 
Inc. v. Houtchens, 567 P. 2d 931 (Mont. 1977). 
Full performance means that the broker has performed the 
act required of him, the procuring of a buyer ready, willing 
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and able to purchase on the owner's terms. A broker may not 
recover for time and money expended in unsuccessful attempts 
because the broker is hired for his skill in arranging a sale 
of the property. The owner is not hiring merely an advertis-
ing agent, but the object of the broker's employment is to 
bring buyer and seller together and consummate a sale of the 
property. The broker's efforts in advertising the property 
and showing it to likely prospects are merely supplementary 
to the main object of his employment. Until an opportunity 
to sell on the owner•·s terms is presented, the broker has 
not performed the object of his employment. Not having per-
formed, he cannot l:e said to have accepted an offer for a uni-. 
lateral contract. In the instant case, Taylor National, in 
order to accept the terms of the listing agreement and be 
entitled to a commission, must have fully performed the terms 
of its contract. And that portion of the contract upon 
which the right to a commission is premised reads: 
During the life of this contract, if you find a party 
who is ready, able and willing to buy, lease or ex-
change said property or any part thereof, at said 
price and terms, or any other price or terms, to 
which I may agree in writing, or if said property 
or any part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged 
during said term by myself or any other party, I agree 
to pay you a commission of 6% for such sale, lease or 
exchange. (Exhibits 9 & 19~) 
The performance required by Taylor National under the con-
tract is no different from that in most other listing agree-
rnents. The broker must procure a buyer who is ready, willing 
and able to purchase, or otherwise exchange the property, on 
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the terms agreed to by the sellers Taylor National has 
failed to prove that it ever fully performed under the con-
tract. While it presented offers to the owner, it did not 
present anyone who was ready to purchase on the terms 
specified by the owner, either in the listing agreement or 
through further negotiation. (Record at 51-2.) 
Because Taylor National never fully performed under the 
listing agreement, it cannot be said to have accepted by 
performance, the offer for a unilateral contract made by 
Jensen Bros. And, as previously established, Taylor National 
failed in any other way to accept the terms and conditions 
offered by Jensen Bros. Having failed to accept the terms 
of the contract, Taylor National may rot now benefit by its 
exclusive right to sell provisions to gain a commission. 
3. THE OFFER MADE BY JENSEN BROS. DID NOT CONTAIN 
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS, AND WAS NOT A VALID CONTRACT OF 
AGENCY. 
A valid contractual offer must contain definite and 
certain terms. Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640, RESTATEME"NT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 32. The Utah Statute of Frauds requires that 
these terms be in writing when the contract employs a broker 
to purchase or sell real estate for compensation. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 25-5-4, Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case 
v. Ralph 188 P. 640. 
The court interpreted the Statute of Frauds to require 
that the writing contained the terms and conditions of the 
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broker's employment. 
The statute is in force in a number of the states of 
the Union, and has by the courts of last resort in 
those states frequently been applied. The courts 
generally hold that under such a statute a real estate 
broker or agent cannot recover commission for ser-
vices rendered in either selling or procuring a pur-
chaser for real property unless it appears: (1) that 
there is an express contract or agreement of authority 
in which the terms and conditions of his employment, 
if any, and the amount of his commission, etc., are 
stated; (2) that such contract be in writing ... Case 
v. Ralph, 188 P. at 642. (Emphasis added.) 
As the Court said in Fritsch v. Hess, 49 Utah 75, 162 
P. 70, 71, "It is well settled that no particular form of 
words is necessary to comply with this statute, and that 
almost any kind of writing will be sufficient if it be signed 
by the party sought to be charged and contains the essential 
terms of a contract." (Emphasis added.) The Court in Smith 
Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. at 917, denied recovery of a 
broker's action for a commission. The Court observed that 
the alleged contract was insufficient because, among other 
things, nothing was said in the writing "as to terms, condi-
tions, time or description of the property." 
It is generally accepted that an offer to contract, to 
be sufficient, must contain specific terms and conditions. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 32. More specifically, 
the courts have held that a broker's contract should state 
the name of the broker, Smith v. Dipietro, 292 P. at 917, 
the time for performance, Id., particularly the expiration 
date, Olson v. Neale, 116 Ariz. 522, 570 Pe2d 209 (Ariz. App. 
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1977), and show, unequivocally, the employment of the broker. 
Maricopa Realty & Trust Co. v. V.R.D. Farms, Inc., 10 Ariz. 
App. 524, 460 P.2d 195, Sanstrum v. Gonser, 140 Cal. App. 2d 
732, 295 P.2d 532, Lathrop v. Gauger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 754, 
274 P.2d 730. 
In the instant case, the listing agreement does not con-
tain "the essential terms of a contract." Fritsch v. Hess, 
162 P. 71. For as previously established, the writing relied 
on by Taylor National is not the offer made by Jensen Bros. 
And the writing which Jensen Bros. offered to Taylor National 
does not contain the terms and conditions required either 
by the Statute of Frauds or principles applicable to con-
tracts in general. The terms missing here include the time, 
or duration, of performance (particularly the exoiration date), 
and the unequivocal employment of the broker. 
Where the duration of the contractual relationship 
has not been specified, the law generally implies that it 
will last for a reasonable time (after which it will be term-
inable at will by either party). Consolidated Theatres v. 
Theatrical Employees Union, 69 Cal. 2d 713. Employment con-
tracts, however, do not last for a reasonable time, but are 
generally terminable at will by either party. Atchison Topeka 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Andrews, 211 F2d 264. 
Such is not the case where real estate broker's employ-
ment contracts are concerned, however. Several state statutes 
require that the duration of the listing agreement be stated 
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explicitly in the writing. Bangle v. Holland Realty Inv. Co., 
80 Nev. 331, 393 P.2d 138 (1964), Saye v. Paradise Memorial 
Gardens, Inc., 92 Nev. 526, 554 P.2d 274 (1976), Summers v. 
Freeman, 128 Cal. App. 2d 828, 276 P.2d 131, and where no such 
statute exists, the courts have required the writing to con-
tain an expiration date. 
Taken together, it seems to us that the public policy 
of this state is that brokers, in order to collect a 
commission, must have a written listing, that the 
listing must contain a definite expiration date, and 
the listing agreement shall be deemed to cancel auto-
matically on that date. Olson v. Neale, 570 P.2d at 
209. 
The policy of the Utah Statute of Frauds, likewise, 
requires that the dates of commencement and termination of 
the listing agreement be stated explicitly. Broker's listing 
agreements have been included within the Statute of Frauds 
. 
in order to protect landowners from fraud and unfounded claims 
of brokers. Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), 
Featherman v. Kennedy, 122 Mont. 256, 200 P.2d 243 (1921), 
Roseberry v. Heckler, 84 Ariz. 247, 326 P.2d 365, Lathrop v. 
Gauger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 754, 274 P.2d 730. A contract which 
does not specify its duration is too indefinite for the 
parties to enforce among themselves; what is a reasonable 
time to the owner may not be reasonable to the broker who has 
yet to procure a buyer. Where the law requires that the 
duration of the broker's contract be stated explicitly, it 
reduces the likelihood of disputes over the issue of what 
constitutes a reasonable time for the duration of the listing, 
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and it should be observed that the real issue in such disputes 
is whether the owner is liable any longer to the broker for 
a commission. Where the duration of a broker's employment has 
been specified in his listing agreement, he is less likely to 
be successful in bringing an unfounded claim against the listing 
owner. Both broker and owner will have the same expectations 
as to the termination date of the contract. This is especially 
valuable where a contract purports to grant the exclusive 
right to sell or an exclusive agency, or where the broker 
is entitled to a commission on a sale consummated months after 
the contract's termination to any prospect procured originally 
by the broker. 
In all of these instances, the owner gives up certain 
rights to sell his property without liability to another. An 
exclusive right to sell prevents the owner from selling the 
property on his own without incurring liability to the list-
ing broker. Wilkins v. W.B.Tilton Real Estate & Ins., Inc. 
257 So.2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). And an exclusive 
aqency prevents the owner from listing his property with any 
other broker. Id. But the right to sell one's own property 
is an inherent right which can only be surrendered in explicit 
language. Lambert v. Haskins, 263 P.2d 433 (Colo. 1953), 
Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, Wilkins v. W.B. Tilton Real 
Estate & Ins. Inc., 257 So. 2d 573. And a contract which 
does not specify the duration for which the owner relinquishes 
such rights is more indefinite than explicit. Utah law should 
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require that a real estate broker's listing agreement state 
explicitly the duration of the contract. Having failed to 
prove an express contract of agency which complies with the 
Statute of Frauds, Taylor National may not recover in quantum 
meruit or under an implied contract. Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 
640, Diggins v. Johnson, 513 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1973), Robert-
son v. Hansen, 89 Idaho 107, 403 P.2d 585 (1965), Isaguirre 
v. Echevarria, 96 Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975), Baugh v. 
Darley, 184 P.2d 335 (Utah 1947), Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah 
276, 198 P. 772, 41 A.L.R. 2d 905. The Court in Case v. 
Ralph stated: 
... in the absence of such an express contract no 
recovery can be had for the reasonable value of the 
services rendered as upon a quantum meruit, nor for 
money and time expended for the use and benefit of the 
owner of the property. It is also held that perfor-
mance or part performance of a parol agreement is 
unavailing. 188 P. at 642. 
And the Court said in Watson v. Odell, 198 P. at 775, "Under 
our statute, the plaintiff could recover a commission only 
by virtue of a contract. He could not recover as upon a 
quantum meruit." 
C. IF TAYLOR NATIONAL HAD A CONTRACT OF AGENCY, IT 
LAPSED BEFORE THE OCCURANCE OF THE EVENT GIVING 
RISE TO A COMMISSION, HAVING ENDURED FOR A REA-
SONABLE TIME. 
Where the duration of a broker's agency is not specified 
in the listing agreement, it does not last indefinitely. The 
broker must perform according to the terms of the listing 
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within reasonable time. 24 ALR 1540, 1547, Robertson v. Wilson, 
121 Wash. 358, 209 P. 841 (1922), Parkey v. Lawrence, 284 S.W. 
283 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1926), Cocquyt v. Shower, 189 P. 606 
(Colo. 1920), 12 CJS Brokers§ 88, Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 
164. 115 A. 723, 24 ALR 1530 (1922), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers 
§54, Martyn v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of West 
Palm Beach, 257, So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Clark 
v. King, 209 Mo. App. 309, 238 S.W. 825 (1922), Reitz v. Oglebay 
251 S.W. 771 (Mo. App. 1923), Boggs v. McMickle, 206 P.2d 824 
(Colo. 1949). Whether a broker has performed according to 
his contract within a reasonable time is a question of fact, 
Vidler v. DeBell, 270 P.2d 120 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1954), 
which depends on the particular circumstances of each case. 
12 CJS Brokers § 88, 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 54, Boggs v. 
McMickle, 206 P.2d 824, Clark v. King, 238 s.w. 825, Reitz v. 
Oglebay, 251 S.W. 771. Among the facts to be considered are 
the nature and character of the service, the magnitude of the 
undertaking, the intention of the parties, and all other perti-
nent facts and circumstances. 12 CJS Brokers § 88. The bur-
den rests with the broker to prove that he performed within 
a reasonable time. 24 ALR 1548. 
As previously established, Taylor National's contract 
of agency failed to specify an expiration date. (Exhibit 19.) 
If the Court finds that the expiration date is not required 
by the Statute of Frauds on a contract purporting to grant an 
exclusive right to sell or an exclusive agency, Taylor National 
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has still failed to prove that it performed within a reason-
able time. 
When given the name of a prospective purchaser -- in 
fact, the ultimate purchaser -- Taylor National failed to 
contact him to even begin negotiations for the sale of the 
house. After prodding Taylor National for three or four 
weeks, Jensen Bros. concluded the sale on its own. Leon 
Jensen of Jensen Bros. first asked Paul Taylor of Taylor 
National to call Harward in early September 1977. (Record 
at 32, lines 5-28; 98, lines 28-30; 99, lines 1-5.) He 
made one unsuccessful attempt, then left for Hawaii. For 
three to four weeks, Leon Jensen repeatedly asked Taylor 
National to contact Harward. (Record at 99, lines 8-30~ 
100, lines 1-12.) Rather than contact Harward, however, 
Taylor National took the position that Harward should contact 
it. (Record at 49-51, 59, 89-93.) Jensen Bros. and Harward 
ultimately concluded the sale on their own only after Taylor 
National had repeatedly refused to contact Harward. (Record 
at 100-102.) Before Leon Jensen told Paul Tavlor of Harward's 
interest in the Barrington House, Taylor National had failed 
to procure any prospects who were willing to meet Jensen Bros.' 
terms. (Record at 30-32, 51-52.) If the house had been 
listed in July 1977, as Taylor National alleges, (Exhibit 9), 
three months had elapsed without one offer which met the 
owner's terms -- and this after exposure in the home show. 
A broker's failure to attempt to contact a prospect within 
-46-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
three to four weeks in any case is unreasonable. Under the 
instant circumstances, it was all the more unreasonable. A 
broker who is given the name and telephone number of a likely 
prospect and who fails to make a crood faith attempt to con-
tact him within a period of three weeks, has not performed 
what his contract reauires of him within a reasonable time. 
Consequently, he may not assert that he performed under the 
terms of his contract before it lapsed. In the present case, 
Taylor National failed to perform under the contract within 
a reasonable time, and has failed to earn a commission on 
the sale of the Barrington House. 
D. EVEN IF TAYLOR NATIONAL HAD PROVEN A VALID CONTRACT 
OF AGENCY, IT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CO~.MISSION 
BECAUSE ITS AUTHORITY HAD BEEN TERMINATED BEFORE 
IT PROCURED A BUYER READY, WILLING, AND ABLE TO 
PURCHASE ON JENSEN BROTHERS' TERMS. 
To be entitled to a real estate sales commission, a 
broker must ordinarily be the procurinq cause of a sale 
before his authority has been terminated. 12 C~J.S. Brokers 
§ 88. The owner may terminate the broker's authority any 
time before a sale as long as the contract of agency is not 
supported by consideration and the owner has not terminated 
in bad faith, that is, to avoid paying a commission on a 
sale to a buyer originally procured by the broker. Flinders 
v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 208 P. 526, 530 (1922), 12 AM. JUR. 
2d Brokers §§ 55, 222. 12 C.J.S. Brokers ~ 66. While some 
~· 
jurisdictions hold that the owner cannot revoke where the 
-47-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
agency is exclusive, 12 AM. "TUR. 2d Brokers § 58, or where 
the contract is to last for a definite time period, 12 AM. 
JUR. 2d Brokers, § 56, this l.S not the case in Utah. 
In Flinders v. Hunter, 208 P. 53 0 I the Utah court set 
out the conditions under which an owner could terminate a 
broker's contract of agency. 
It will thus be seen that where, as here, the appoint-
ment is not supported by any consideration, although 
the authority to sell is in terms exclusive and a 
fixed period of time is named, yet the owner can 
terminate the authority at any time before a sale is 
effected by the broker, and the broker has no claim 
against the owner for commission or otherwise unless 
the broker alleges and proves that the authority was 
terminated in bad faith and for the purpose of selling 
to one of his customers by the owner himself to avoid 
the payment of a commission. 208 P. at 530. 
In the present case, because Jensen Bros. terminated 
its authority, Taylor National has no claim for a "commission 
. 
or otherwise." Id. Tavlor National has failed to show that 
.J. 
the listing agreement here was supported by consideration. 
It bases its claim for a recovery in this action solely on 
the listing agreement introduced at the trial as Exhibit 9. 
(Record at 18.) Nowhere in that writing is there a reference 
to the consideration furnished by the broker. And in connec-
tion with the termination of a broker's authority, the acts 
required of him under the contract are not the kind of 
consideration contemplated by the law. 28 A.L.R. 893. 
An owner may terminate his broker's authority as long 
as he does so in good faith and does not do so to avoid paying 
a commission on a sale to a buyer previously procured by the 
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broker. Flinders v. Hunter, 208 P. 530. It has been said 
that the test of bad faith is whether the owner's purpose in 
terminating the broker's agency is to avoid payment of a 
commission. Snvder v. Schram, 282 Or. 273, 577 P.2d 935 
(1978). And the burden of proving bad faith rests with the 
broker. Flinders v. Hunter 208 P. 530. Jensen Bros. did not 
terminate Taylor National's authority so that it could sell 
the property on its own to a buyer procured by the broker 
and thus avoid liability for a commission. Rather, Jensen 
Bros. sold the Barrington House to Harward, a purchaser 
procured solely by Jensen Bros. Representatives of Taylor 
National were given repeated instructions to contact Harward, 
but failed to do so and ultimately took the position that if 
he wanted to purchase, Harward would have to contact them. 
(Record at 49-51, 58-9, 62, 60, 79, 89, 91-3.) It was only 
after Jensen had failed to get Taylor National to do anything 
about contacting its prospect that Jensen and Harward began 
negotiations, independent of Taylor National, for the sale 
of the Barrington House. (Record at 149, 98-102.) At no 
time did Taylor National present Jensen Bros. with a ready, 
willing and able buyer who had been procured by them. (Record 
at 51-2, 86-7.) 
In the face of his own worries about Harward's desire 
to purchase "in a hurry" or look elsewhere, (Record at 103-4, 
125.), Jensen gave Taylor National more than a reasonable time 
to negotiate a sale. Jensen Bros. exhibited the utmost good 
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faith in terminatina Taylor National's authority. Having been 
given the name and phone number of a ready, willing, able, 
and waiting purchaser, Taylor National's failure to procure 
him as a purchaser, thus earning a right to a commission, 
can be attributed solely to Taylor National's inaction, 
neglect, and intransigence. Taylor National has failed to 
prove bad faith on the part of Jensen Bros. as required by 
Flinders. Thus it may not claim that its authority was wrong-
fully terminated, nor claim a right to recover against Jensen 
or Harward. 
An owner may revoke the broker's authority by express 
notification or the revocation can be implied from the acts 
of the parties. 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 60. In the instant 
case, Jensen Bros. notified Taylor National in September of 
1977 that it had contracted to sell the Barrington House to 
Harward. (Record at 33-34.) In light of the prior dealings 
between Jensen Bros. and Taylor National ~- the numerous 
attempts by Jensen Bros. to have Taylor National contact Harward 
-- and Taylor National's position that Harward would have to 
contact it, if there was to be a sale -- the sale by Jensen 
Bros. on its own indicated to Taylor National that its ser-
vices were no longer being used. But further, it has been 
held that the sale of the property by the owner constitutes 
an implied revocation. Harris v. McPherson, 115 A. 723 (Conn. 
1922), Walsh v. Grant, 152 N.E. 884, 885 (Mass. 1926), 
Kennedy & Kennedy v. Vance, 202 P.2d 214, 215 (Okla. 1949), 
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Trimmer v. Ludtke, 105 Ariz. 260, 462 P.2d 809, 811 (1969), 
Roberts v. Gardner, Clarke & Sullivan, 275 P.2d 245, 247 
(Okla. 1954). Some of these cases grant the right to termi-
nate by sale only in nonexclusive situations. However, 
Flinders indicates that the exclusivity of the broker's 
listing agreement has no effect on the owner's power to revoke 
in Utah. Jensen Bros. informed Taylor National of the sale, 
and the authority to sell was revoked at that time. 
Further justification for Jensen Bros.' termination of 
Taylor National's authority lies in the fact that Taylor 
National did not make reasonable efforts to sell the Barring-
ton House. The court in Fischer v. Patterson, 86 A.2d 851, 
852 (N.H. 1952) indicated that a broker's failure to use 
reasonable efforts to sell is a breach of duty, which may 
justify rescission of the contract ·of agency. And in Harris 
v. Crocker, 86 A.2d 853 (N.H. 1952) the court held that an 
owner's termination of a broker's listinq agreement was 
justified where the broker breached his duty to use reasonable 
efforts to make a sale. Finally, in Dixon v. Gustav, 318 
P.2d 965 (Wash. 1957), the court held that an owner was 
justified in terminating a listing agreement where a broker 
holding an exclusive listing rnade no effort to sell. As 
has been discussed, Taylor National first neglected, then 
refused, to contact a known prospect. Taylor National not 
only failed to make reasonable efforts to sell, it took no 
effort to sell. Rather it indicated to Jensen Bros. that the 
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buyer would have to make the efforts to effect a sale. Con-
sequently, Jensen Bros. could have terminated Taylor National's 
listinq for its failure to contact Harward. A broker whose 
authority is, in good faith, terminated before he has effected 
a sale is not entitled to a commission, even though he may 
have devoted time and labor and expended his money. E.B. 
Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 137 P.2d 342. 
In the present case, Taylor National's authority was 
terminated by Jensen Bros. before it performed under the 
contract by procuring a purchaser ready, willing and able to 
buy on the owner's terms. Accordingly, Taylor National was 
not entitled to a commission on the sale of the Barrington 
House. 
E. EVEN IF TAYLOR NATIONAL HAD PROVEN A VALID CONTRACT 
OF AGENCY, JENSEN BROS. WAS FREE TO SELL THE HOUSE 
ON ITS OWN WITHOUT INCURRING LIABILITY FOR A REAL 
ESTATE SALES COMMISSION. 
The right of an owner to sell his own property is inherent, 
and is retained when a real estate broker is employed unless 
the contract of agency provides otherwise by clear and unequi-
vocal terms. Dorman Realty & Ins. Co., Inc., v. Stalvey, 
212 S.E. 2d 591 {S.C. 1975). An owner impliedly retains the 
right to sell his own property without liability to the broker 
unless such right is explicitly waived. Wright v. Vernon, 
183 P.2d 908 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), Lambert v. Haskins, 
263 P.2d 433 (Colo. 1953), J.L. Lemmon Co.~. Oppenheimer, 
8 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1932). As the court said in Peeler Ins. & 
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Realty, Inc. v. Harmon, 20 N.C. App. 78, 200 S.E. 2d 443, 445 
(1973), "Since the right of alienation has become such an 
integral part of property, it is only proper that the contract 
expressly negative this right before it is lost." 
The owner's right to sell without incurring liability 
to the listing broker may be waived by granting the broker 
an exclusive agency or an exclusive right to sell. Under an 
exclusive right to sell, the owner may not sell his property 
either by himself or through another broker without incurring 
liability for a commission to the listing broker. Tetrick v. 
Sloan, 339 P.2d 613 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), E.A. Strout 
Western Realty Agency, Inc. Ve Gregoire, 225 P.2d 585 (Calif. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1951), Foltz v. Begnoche, 222 Kan. 383, 565 
P.2d·592 (1977), Dorman Realty & Ins. Co. Inc. v. Stalvey, 
212 S.E. 2d 591, Zifcak v. Monroe, 249 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1969). 
Under an exclusive agency, the owner may not list his property 
with other brokers during the life of the contract. However, 
he is not precluded from selling the property to a buyer pro-
cured on his own, and such a sale does not subject him to 
liability to the broker for a commission. Tetrick v. Sloan, 
339 P.2d 613, Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, Zifcak v. 
Monroe, 249 A.2d 893, Dorman Realty & Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stal~e~ 
212 S.E. 2d 591, Bourgoin v. Fortier, 310 A.2d 618 (Me. 1973). 
In the present case, Jensen Bros. procured the buyer of 
the Barrington House on its own. In order to recover a com-
mission, then, Taylor National must prove that its alleged 
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listing agreement granted it an exclusive right to sell. 
For Jensen Bros. did not list the property with another bro-
ker. And under an exclusive agency contract, the owner may 
sell on his own without paying a commission as long as he 
does not list the property with another broker. Under an 
open listing contract, the owner may sell to anyone not 
procured by his broker. Nash v. Goar, 94 Ariz. 316, 383 
P.2d 871 (1963). 
An exclusive right to sell may be created only by clear, 
unambiguous language within the four corners of the written 
contract. Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, J.L. Lemmon Co. 
v. Oppenheimer, 8 P.2d 679. The exclusive right to sell 
exists only where it is unequivocally granted in the broker's 
contract. Dixson v. Kattel, 311 So.2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975), Wilkins v. W.B. Tilton Real Estate & Ins., Inc. 
257 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), Dorman Realty 
& Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stalvey 212 S.E. 2d 591. And use of the 
term "Exclusive right" or "Exclusive Listing Contract," by 
itself, does not determine whether the written listing agree-
ment grants the broker the exclusive right to sell. Peeler 
Ins. & Realty, Inc. v. Harmon, 200 S.E. 2d 443, Dorman Realty 
& Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stalvey, 212 S.E. 2d 591, Suddereth v. 
Putty, 446 s.w. 2d 929 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969), Foltz v. 
Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592. 
The listing agreement upon which Taylor National seeks 
to recover a commission (Exhibit 9) does not grant an exclusive 
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right to sell. Nowhere in the writing is there a clear, 
unequivocal, and unambiguous grant of such a right. While 
the second paragraph of the listing agreement, standing 
alone, seems to grant the exclusive right to sell, it is 
given only for the "life of this contract." (Exhibit 9, 19) 
And it has been established that Jensen Bros. failed to 
specify an expiration date or a listing date when it executed 
the agreement. Consequently, the life of the contract cannot 
be determined and the exclusive right to sell is not clearly 
and unequivocally granted by the terms of the listing agree-
ment. 
Even if Marvin Jensen had been the party who provided 
the listing and expiration dates on the instrument, there 
would still be an ambiguity present. For while Paul Taylor 
testified that the dates which appear at the top of the list-
ing read "7-1-77" and "12-1-77", (Record at 45), the listing 
date could just as easily be read as "6-1-77." The party 
who wrote the numbers in the blank for the "listing Date" 
appears to have superimposed the numbers six and seven in 
designating the month the listing was to begin. It is not 
clear whether it begins in June or July. The date on which 
the listing is to begin is ambiguous, causing the "life of 
the contract" to be ambiguous also. 
In the first paragraph of the main body of the listing 
agreement, a blank left unfilled creates further ambiguities 
regarding the exclusive right to sell. 
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In consideration of your agreement to list the property 
described herein and to use reasonable efforts to find 
a purchaser or tenant therefor, I hereby grant you 
for the period of months from date hereof 
the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said 
property or any part thereof, at the price and terms 
stated hereon, or at such other price or terms to 
which I may agree in writing. (Exhibit 9, 19, para-
graph 1.) 
On its face, the paragraph appears to grant the exclusive 
right to sell. However, that right has been given for a 
period of "no months." In a similar case, the Washington 
Supreme Court held that an unfilled blank space where the 
commission should have been created no promise to pay a 
commission. Black v. Milliken, 143 Wash. 204, 255 P. 101 
(1927). A similar reading of this listing agreement would 
lead to the conclusion that Jensen Bros. intended to give 
no exclusive right of sale in this listing agreement. Had 
Jensen Bros. intended to grant the exclusive right to sell 
the property it would have specified the duration of that 
right in the listing agreement. It did not, however, and 
this fact, taken together with the wording in paragraph two 
creates ambiguities. For the wording in paragraph two appears 
to grant an exclusive right to sell by creating the right to 
a conunission if the property is sold by Jensen Bros. "or any 
other party. " (Exhibit 9, 19.) The meaning of the two 
paragraphs appear to conflict. As a result, it cannot be 
said that they grant the exclusive right to sell clearly, 
unequivocally, and unambiguously. 
Adding to the ambiguity is the handwritten term at the 
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top of Exhibit 9: "Office Exclusive." Representatives of 
Taylor National, which had the burden of proving a valid 
contract of agency, failed to explain the meaning of this 
term at the trial. But even if they had, it would still 
create ambiguities in the writing itself. For an exclusive 
right to sell must be granted clearly and unambiguously within 
the four corners of the written contract. Foltz v. Begnoche, 
565 P.2d 592. And the term "Office Exclusive" seems to indi-
cate that Taylor National was intended to be the exclusive 
realty office to handle the sale of the Barrington House. 
If such were the case, Taylor National would have an exclusive 
agency, and not an exclusive right to sell. For an exclusive 
agency prevents the owner from listing his property with 
other brokers for sale. Tetrick v. Sloan, 339 P.2d 613, 
Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, Zifcak v. Monroe, 249 A.2d_ 
893, Dorman Realty & Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stalvey, 212 S.E. 2d 
591, Bourgoin v. Fortier, 310 A.2d 618. And had Taylor 
National desired a more restrictive condition in the listing 
agreement it would have had "Exclusive Right to Sell" written 
there. Taken together with the other terms of the contract, 
the handwritten term "Office Exclusive" creates ambiguities 
regarding the exclusive right to sell provisions of the con-
tract. Consequently, that right has not been granted within 
the four corners of the listing agreement. 
Where ambiguities are found in a broker's contract of 
agency, they are to be construed against him, especially where 
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he prepared the contract of agency. Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 
510 (Utah 1951), Bob Secolo Realty, Inv. v. Dunnigan, 36 or. 
App. 11, 583 P.2d 1154 (Ore. Ct. App. 1978), Foltz v. Begnoche, 
565 P.2d 592, E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
Gregoire, 225 P.2d 585, 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers§§ 33, 157, 
227. Where ambiguities exist, they will be construed to 
protect the owner. 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 227. In the 
instant case, representatives of Taylor National testified 
that they had the contract of agency typed at their office 
and delivered it to Marvin Jensen for his signature. (Record 
at 18, 45-46, 129-32.) Since Taylor National prepared the 
listing agreement, the ambiguities present there should be 
construed against Taylor National. Accordingly, no exclu-
sive right to sell can be said to have been granted in the 
listing agreement. In addition, it has already been seen 
that the exclusive right to sell was not granted clearly, 
unequivocally, and unambiguously within the four corners of 
the writing. Consequently, Taylor National was not entitled 
to a conunission when Jensen Bros. sold the property to a 
buyer which it procured on its own .. 
Even assuming that Taylor National had an exclusive 
right to sell, it would still not be entitled to a commis-
sion on the Barrington House. For as previously pointed out, 
representatives of Taylor National failed to contact the 
ultimate buyer after having been instructed to do so by 
Jensen Bros. Taylor National took the position that the 
-58--
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
buyer should contact the broker to effect a sale. Yet in 
Schoenmann v. Whitt, 136 Wis. 332, 117 N.W. 851, the court 
held that the owner could sell his land without incurring 
liability to the broker under a listing agreement granting 
an exclusive right to sell because the broker had not accepted 
the implied obligations of the instrument by using ordinary 
diligence to make a sale of the property. Here, Taylor 
National did not use ordinary diligence in arranging for a 
sale with Harward. Furthermore, in Huchting v. Rahn, 179 
Wis. 50, 190 N.W. 847, the court held that under an exclusive 
right to sell, "the broker cannot remain idle and expect a 
commission upon a sale effected through the efforts of the 
owner." 
The evidence establishes that Taylor National was not 
given an exclusive right to sell the Barrington House. But 
even if it was given such a right, it failed to meet its 
obligations of diligence and Jensen Bros. was free to sell 
the property, in any case, without incurring liability for a 
broker's commission. 
F. TAYLOR NATIONAL MAY NOT RECOVER A COMMISSION BE-
CAUSE IT WAS NOT THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE 
OF THE BARRINGTON HOME. 
Unless his contract of employment is to the contrary, 
a real estate broker must be the procuring cause of a sale 
or transaction in order to be entitled to a commission. 
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 utah 2d. 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962 
Essres Realty & Ins., Inc. v. Zeff, 512 P.2d 650 (Colo. ct. 
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App. 1973), Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d 713 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1970), Hiniger v. Judy, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305 (1965), 
Bartsas Realty, Inc. v. Leverton, 409 P.2d 627 (Nev. 1966), 
Bonanza Real Estate, Inc. v. Crouch, 10 Wash. App. 380, 517 
P.2d 1371 (1974), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 189, 12 C.J.S. 
Brokers § 9la. Ordinarily, the broker becomes entitled to a 
commission when his principal accepts the party procured by 
him and the two of them enter into a binding contract. 
Mattingly-Lusky Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W. 2d 240, 241 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1929), Bonanza Real Estate, Inc. v. Crouch, 517 P.2d 
at 1375. As the court said in Kern v. Lewis, 
Before a broker can be said to have earned his com-
mission, he must produce a purchaser ready, willing 
and able to buy on the owner's terms, and he must be 
the efficient agent or procuring cause of the salee 
Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d at 714. 
Whether a broker has been the procuring cause of a 
sale depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266, 269 
(1962.), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 190. However, several guid-
ing principles have been outlined by the courts. 
The term "procuring cause" as used in describing a 
broker's activity refers to a cause originating a 
series of events which, without break in their con-
tinuity, result in accomplishment of the prime objec-
tive of employment of the broker, producing a purchaser 
ready, willing, and able to buy real estate on the 
owner's terms. Clark v. Ellsworth, 66 Ariz. 119, 
18 4 p . 2 d 8 21 ' 8 2 2 ( 19 4 7) . 
The Utah Court has set down the following guidelines to 
determine whether a broker has been the procuring cause in a 
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sale of real estate: 
It is undoubtedly true that a broker employed to nego-
tiate a sale of real estate may recover compensation 
for his services when a customer has been procured 
by him who is able, willing, and ready to purchase 
upon the terms named by the seller, even though the 
sale is not completed; for in such case, the service 
is performed, the parties brought together, and the 
opportunity to sell is presented to the owner of the 
property. But in order that it may be said that a 
customer has been "procured," it certainly is nec-
essary that the seller and the buyer be, in some way, 
brought together so that the seller has the oppor-
tunity to sell, the opportunity to do which is, after 
all, the purpose of the employment between the owner 
and the broker. This has not been accomplished, that 
is, the opportunity to sell has not been presented to 
the owner, unless the broker has either made such a 
contract with the purchaser, in case the purchaser's 
identity be not disclosed, following the terms fixed 
by the owner, as will bind the purchaser to the pay-
ment of damages in case of breach by the purchaser, or 
the seller and the buyer are brought together so that 
the seller can deal directly with the buyer. If 
neither of these conditions exist, then no opportunity 
to sell has been brought to the owner, and the pro-
posed customer has not been "procured" in the sense 
in which that word is used in a broker's contract. 
Fritsch v. Hess, 162 P. at 71-72. 
Taylor National has failed to prove that it was the 
procuring cause of the sale of the Barrington House. It was 
certainly not the "cause originating a series of events" which 
resulted in the sale of the house. For while representatives 
of Taylor National manned the house during the home show, 
(Record at 22, lines 13-23; 28, lines 9-27; 29, lines 7-22), 
no evidence was presented to show that Taylor National showed 
the home to Harward, (recorded at 350-351), or opened nego-
tiations with him for purchase of the house. Harward con-
tacted Jensen on his own some time after the home show had 
ended to arrange to purchase the house. (Record at 98, lines 
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8-14.) Rather than attempting to bring Harward and Jensen 
Bros. to an aqreement on the sale of the home, representa-
tives of Taylor National took the position that it was the 
buyer's responsibility to contact the broker to arrange a 
sale. (Record at 49-51, 59, 89, 91-93.) 
Taylor National did nothing to play an active role in 
bringing the parties together to conclude a sale. After in-
forming Taylor National that Harward was interested in pur-
chasing the Barrington House, Jensen instructed Taylor Nation-
al representatives to contact Harward. They failed to do 
this. (Record at 31, lines 28-30; 32, lines 1-26.) Instead, 
Paul Taylor made one unsuccessful attempt to contact Harward 
and left for Hawaii. Upon his return, he still failed to 
bring Harward and Jensen Bros. together. 
Q When you returned from Hawaii, why didn'·t you 
attempt to complete the transaction with Leon 
Jensen -- or with Leon Harward? I'm sorry. 
A You•ve heard my testimony on that, Counsel~ 
Q Weren't you in control? 
A I was not. 
Q As the listing agent, wasnft it your responsibility 
to handle the closing? 
A It should have been, according to procedure. I would 
like to have been in control. Thatrs my great concern 
is that I lost control. 
Q Did you make any attempt to contact Leon Harward to 
handle the transaction? 
A No. 
{Record at 49, lines 16-29.) 
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But even if Taylor National had first shown the property 
to Harward or had opened negotiations with him, this alone 
would not be sufficient to constitute the procuring cause. 
For a broker who merely introduces the parties to the trans-
action to each other, without further action on his part 
cannot be said to be the procuring cause of a sale which is 
later consummated without him. Hurley v. Kallof, 2 Ariz. 
App. 446, 409 P.2d 730, 733 (1966), Rohs v. Hickam, 473 P.2d 
732 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970), Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d 713 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1970), Mattingly-Lusky Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W. 
2d 241. And where the broker merely mentions to the prospec-
tive purchaser that the ·property is for sale, his actions 
are not sufficient to constitute procuring cause. Patterson 
v. Blair, 123 Utah 216, 257 P.2d 944 (1953), Hiniger v. Judy, 
398 P.2d at 315. The broker must keep the lines of comrnuni-
cation open between himself and the prospective buyer. Hurley 
-v. Kallof, 409 P.2d 733. 
Because Taylor National was not the procuring cause of 
the sale of the Barrington House, it is not entitled to 
recover a commission in this action. 
G. TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION 
ON THE SALE OF THE BARRINGTON HOUSE BECAUSE IT 
BREACHED THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES WHICH IT OWED TO 
JENSEN BROS. 
A broker must represent the interests of his employer 
with good faith, and must discharqe his duties with reasonable 
skill and diligence. Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d 238, 
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240 (Utah 1953), Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 
410, 412 (1958), Shatz Realty Co. v. King, 10 S.W. 2d 456, 
458 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928), 12 C.J.S. Brokers §§ 23, 26, McMenarnin 
v. Bishop, 6 Wash. App. 455, 493 P.2d 1016 (1972), Vivian 
Arnold Realty Co. v. McCormick, 19 Ariz. App. 289, 506 P.2d 
1'074 (1973), Geise v. Taro, 92 Idaho 243, 440 P.2d 521 (1968), 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGE~~y § 401. A fiduciary relationship 
exists between the broker and principal. Reese v. Harper, 
329 P.2d 412, and he is under a duty to follow the instructions 
of his principal. E.A. Strout Realty Agency v. Wooster, 99 
A.2d 689 (Vt. 1953), Lowrance v. Swaffield, 123 So. Car. 331, 
116 S.E. 278 (1923), Shatz Realty Co. v. King, 225 Ky, 846, 
10 S.W. 2d 456, 60 A.L.R. 1374 (1928), 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 25. 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to 
obey all reasonable directions in regard to the manner of per-
forming a service that he is contracted to perform." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY§ 385 (1958). It is the principal's 
judgment, not the agent's, that is to control. E.A. Strout 
v. Wooster, 99 A.2d at 692. 
Furthermore, a broker must make reasonable efforts to 
sell the property. 94 ALR 2d 468, 473 § 5, Fitzpatrick v. 
Federer Realty Co., 351 s.w. 2d 673 (Mo. 1961), Fischer v. 
Patterson, 97 N.H. 318, 86 A.2d 851 (1952), Sieqel v. Rosenzweig, 
- -
129 App. Div. 547, 114 NYS 179 (1908), Hayes v. Clark, 111 "A. 
781 (Conn. 1920). His failure to do so may be grounds for 
revocation of his contract of agency and loss of his opportunity 
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to earn a commission. Fischer v. Patterson, 86 A.2d 851, 
852. And a broker's efforts should be greater where he holds 
an exclusive agency, because the owner is more dependent 
on that one broker for the sale of the property, Id. 
A broker's failure to discharge his duties in good 
faith and with reasonable skill and diligence precludes his 
recovery for the service he purports to be rendering. Reese 
v. Harper, 329 P.2d 412, Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d 
240, 12 AM JUR 2d Brokers § 96. The broker is not entitled 
to a commission if he breaches his fiduciary duties. Mason 
v. Bulleri, 25 Ariz. App. 357, 543 P.2d 478 (1975). 
In the instant case, Taylor National is not entitled to 
a commission because it has failed to discharge its duties in 
good faith, with reasonable skill and diligence, and because 
it has breached its fiduciary duties. First, Taylor National 
failed to follow the instructions of its principal, Jensen 
Bros. Construction. When Jensen Bros. learned that Harward 
was interested in purchasing the Barrington House, he con-
tacted Paul Taylor at Taylor National, gave him Harward's 
telephone number, and instructed him to contact Harward. 
(Record at 31-2, 98-99). After one unsuccessful attempt to 
call Harward, Paul Taylor left town for Hawaii. (Record at 
31-32). While he was out of town, Bryce Taylor did nothing 
to contact Harward. (Record at 90.) Rather than following 
Jensen Bros.' instructions, Taylor National instructed Jensen 
Bros. that it was Harward's duty to contact it. (Record at 
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49-SO, 51, 59, 91-93, 89). Taylor National did not follow 
the instructions of Jensen Bros., but rather, told Jensen 
Bros. that it would not follow those instructions. Leon 
Jensen's instructions were reasonable, in that he only asked 
Taylor National to call Harward on the phone to begin negotia-
tions. In fact, Jensen was providing the way for Taylor 
National to begin earning its commission. Taylor National 
had a duty to follow Jensen's instructions and contact Harward. 
Its failure to do so after Jensen had repeatedly requested 
such represents a breach of its fiduciary duty and precludes 
recovery of a commission. 
It should be noted that there were no valid reasons for 
Taylor National's refusal to contact Harward after being 
instructed to do so by its principal, Jensen Bros. For while 
representa~ives of Taylor National claim that they did not 
have a duty to contact Harward because he was a real estate 
broker, they never ascertained this fact for a reasonable 
certainty. Thus, at the trial, held over a year after the 
transactions in question, representatives of Taylor National 
had still not determined whether or not Harward was a real 
estate agent and were still referring to him as "the alleged 
broker." (Record at 92, lines 6-20.} Whether he was a 
broker or not, however, was irrelevant because he was not 
arranging to sell to another, but really was just another 
buyer. On the other hand, Taylor National representatives did 
know that Harward was a prospective buyer. And when they failed 
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to contact him, they breached their duties of diligence to 
Jensen Bros. 
Taylor National did not take reasonable efforts to sell 
the property. This too, precludes its recovery on the con-
tract. Representatives of Taylor National were given a known 
prospect -- Harward. They never contacted him. All Taylor 
National was asked to do was contact Harward to ask if he 
was willing to purchase on Jensen's terms. Once having 
determined that he was, Taylor National could have brought 
the two parties together and a sale could have been consummated 
Rather, Taylor National chose to do nothing -- it sat back 
waiting for Harward to call. (Record at 44-51, 59, 89, 91-93.) 
These are certainly not reasonable efforts from a broker 
who wishes to earn a commission by selling a house, and are 
not reasonable actions under these circumstances. 
Taylor National had been neither reasonably diligent nor 
skilled in its handling of the sale of the Barrington House. 
It is, therefore, by reason of its breach of its fiduciary 
duty owed to the owner, not entitled to a commission when 
Jensen and Harward ultimately negotiated the sale themselves. 
H. TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER A COM-
MISSION ON THE SALE OF THE BARRINGTON HOME BECAUSE 
IT ABANDONED ITS AGENCY. 
A real estate broker is not entitled to a commission on 
a sale which is consummated after he abandoned his agency. 
Vincent v. Weber, 13 Ohio Misc. 280, 232, N.W. 2d 671 (Ohio 
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Mun. 1965), Bonanza Real Estate, Inc. v. Crouch, 10 Wash. App. 
380, 517 P.2d 1371 (1974), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 223 (1979), 
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 65. He will be denied a commission even 
if he brought the parties together, or opened negotiations, 
but later abandoned further efforts to conclude a sale and 
it was concluded by another. Essres Realty & Ins., Inc. v. 
Zeff, 512 P.2d 650 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973), Parrish Vo Ragsdale 
Realty Co., 135 Ga. App. 491, 218 S.W. 2d 164 (1975), Baird 
v. Madsen, 57 Cal. App. 2d 465, 134 P.2d 885 (Calif. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1943), Hurley v. Kallof, 2 Ariz. App. 446, 409 P.2d 730 
(1966), 12 AM.JUR. 2d Brokers § 223. A broker will be found 
to have abandoned his agency whenever he has ceased his efforts 
to accomplish the purpose of his employment. Mattingly-Lusky 
Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W. 2d, 240, 241 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929). 
Whether a broker has abandoned his agency is a question 
of intent, Lathem v. Coleman, 134 SoW. 2d 703 (Texc Civ. App. 
1940), Trinity Gravel Co.~. Cranke, 282 SoWo 798 modifying 
Cranke v. Trinity Gravel Co., 272 SoW. 604, Bradley v. Blandin, 
---- -
94 Vt. 243, 110 A. 309 (1920h 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 65, and is 
dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case. E.A. Strout Realty Agency, Inc. v. Wooster, 99 A 0 2d 
689 (Vt. 1953), Bradley v. Blandin, 110 A. 309, Macwilliams 
v. Bright, 273 Md. 632, 331 A.2d 303 (1975), 12 AM. JUR. 2d 
Brokers § 223. 
In the instant case, Taylor National was instructed 
several times to contact Harward to arrange a sale of the 
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Barrington House. (Record at 98-100). At no time did 
representatives of Taylor National contact Harward, however. 
Paul Taylor even testified that he neglected the matter. 
Q ••• In September of 1977, did you have any contact 
with people at Jensen Brothers concerning a pros-
pective sale to Harward? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what was the first contact you had in that respect? 
A Leon Jensen called me, and he called me to indicate 
that he wasn't too happy with the quantity of ad-
vertising that was being done, in the process in-
formed me that he had a buyer for the home who was 
a licensed real estate salesman. 
Q And did he tell you who it was? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And who did he say it was? 
A Leon Harward. 
Q And what were you do to, in respect to your company? 
A He gave me Mr. Harward's telephone number and sug-
gested that I call him. 
Q Do you remember the approximate date of that tele-
phone call? 
A That would be early in September. 
Q Did you call Mr. Harward? 
A I attempted, once. 
Q And did you reach him? 
A No. 
Q What happened next? 
A I was involved in a trip to Hawaii and the call was, 
I forgot it, neglected it. 
(Testimony of Paul Taylor, Record at 31, lines 29-30: 
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32, lines 1-26.) 
Taylor National has abandoned its agency by failing to 
follow a known lead at the specific instructions of its prin-
cipal. By so doing, Taylor National ceased its efforts to 
accomplish the purpose of its employment. Mattingly-Lusky 
Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W. 2d 240, 241. Accordingly, when 
the Barrington House was sold, Taylor National was not entitled 
to a com.mission, having already abandoned its agency. 
IV 
JENSEN BROS. IS LIABLE TO HARWARD FOR DAMAGES 
FLOWING FROM THE BREACH OF AN IMPLIED 
WARRANTY THAT THE HOUSE WOULD BE BUILT IN A WORKMANLIKE 
MANNER AND WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR HABITATION. 
The rule of caveat emptor, applied at one time to the 
purchase of new homes, no longer meets the needs and realities 
of modern home buying. As a result, an increasing number of 
courts have been unwilling to apply the rule. 
The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is 
an anachronism patently out of harmony with modern 
home buying practices. It does a disservice not 
only to the ordinary prudent purchaser but to the 
industry itself by lending encouragement to the un-
scrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of 
shoddy work. Jeanguneat Ve Jackie Harnes Construction 
Co., 576 P.2d 761, 763 (_Okla. 1978), [quoting Humber 
v. Morton, 426 S.W. 2d 544, 562 (Tex. 1968) e] 
In place of the rule of caveat emptor, courts have irn-
posed an implied warranty of quality in the sale of new homes. 
Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 115 Cal. Rptre 648, 
525 P.2d 88 (1974). The court in Pollard discussed the 
reasons for the imposition of such a rule. 
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In the setting of the marketplace, the builder or seller 
of new construction -- not unlike the rnanuf acturer or 
merchandiser of personalty -- makes implied representa-
tions, ordinarily indispensable to the sale, that the 
builder has used reasonable skill and judgment in con-
structing the building. On the other hand, the pur-
chaser does not usually possess the knowledge of the 
builder and is unable to fully examine a completed 
house and its components without disturbing the finished 
product. Further, unlike the purchaser of an older 
building, he has no opportunity to observe how the 
building has withstood the passage of time. Thus he 
generally relies on those in a position to know the 
quality of the work to be sold, and his reliance is 
surely evident to the construction industry. Pollard 
v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 525 P.2d at 91. 
The court concluded that "builders and sellers of new 
construction should be held to what is impliedly represented 
that the completed structure was designed and.constructed 
in a reasonably workmanlike manner." Id. The implied 
warranty that a home is built in a reasonably workmanlike 
manner and is suitable for habitation has recently been 
applied in several jurisdictions surrounding Utah. Belt v. 
Spencer, 585 P.2d 922 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978), Mulhern v. Hederich 
430 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1967), Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 
399 (Colo. 1964), Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Hornes, Inc., 578 
P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978), Jeanguneat v. Jackie Harnes Construction 
Co., 576 P.2d 761, Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019 (Ore.1974), 
Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1972). 
This warranty is a form of strict liability, Chandler v. 
Bunick, 279 Or. 353, 569 P.2d 1037 (1977), Gay v. Cornwall, 
494 P.2d 1371, and the builder may be liable for damages for 
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breach of the warranty, Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 922, even 
where he has exercised reasonable care, or even all possible 
care. Chandler v. Bunick, 569 P.2d at 1039. Consequently, 
he is liable for the cost of remedying the defects. Gay v. 
Cornwall, 494 P.2d 1371. 
The measure of damages for a breach of the warranty is 
the difference between the actual value of the property at 
the time it was sold and its value if it had been as warranted. 
Glisan v. Srnolenske, 387 P.2d 260, 263 (Colo. 1963). However, 
where the buyer has retained and used the property, he may 
make reasonable expenditures to put the property into con-
forrnity with the warranty. Id~ Where he does so, the cost 
of such expenditures may represent his measure of damages. Id. 
In the case aptly titled House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 
199 (Wash. 1969), Mr. and Mrs. House purchased a new house 
from a builder~vendor. After a short period of time, cracks 
started to appear in the walls and the doors didn't fit 
their frames because the foundation was slipping. The 
Houses brought suit for rescission of the contract of sale. 
In holding for the Houses, the Court observed that there 
was nothing more vital to a house than a stable foundation. 
And the court held that it didn't matter whether the defect 
in the foundation was a result of the ground itself or the 
foundation's design. The court concluded: 
We apprehend it to be the rule that, when a vendor-
builder sells a new house to its first intended 
occupant, he impliedly warrants that the foundations 
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supporting it are firm and secure and that the house 
is structurally safe for the buyer's intended pur-
pose of living in it. House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d at 204. 
In numerous other cases, the courts have given relief to the 
purchasers of new homes for unstable foundations which gave 
rise to cracked walls, warped floors, and doors which did not 
properly fit their frames. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Hornes, 
Inc. 578 P.2d 637, Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 922, Mulhern 
v. Hederich, 430 P.2d 469, Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 
399, Glisan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260. 
The evidence in this case indicates that Jensen Bros. 
breached the implied warranty of habitability in connection 
with the Barrington House. Jensen Bros. was the builder and 
seller of the Barrington House, and the home was new when 
purchased by Harward -- he is its first and only occupant. 
The testimony at trial indicated that the outside founda-
tion of the Barrington House is settling at a faster rate 
than the center foundation. (Record at 231-232.) This has 
caused large cracks in the brick and inside walls, movement 
in the walls, cracks in the concrete floor of the garage, 
and doors that no longer fit their frames properly. (Record 
at 231-235, 376, 409-410.) (Exhibits 44A-44K.) These damages 
are very similar to those on which recovery was granted in 
the case of House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199, Duncan v. 
Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637, Belt v. Spencer, 
585 P.2d 922, Mulhern v. Hederich, 430 P.2d 469, Carpenter v. 
Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399, and Glisan v. Srnolenske, 387 P.2d 260. 
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At the trial, a general contractor specializing in building 
construction repair (Record at 231, 374} testified as to the 
extent and measure of damage to the Barrington House. After 
a careful and detailed examination of the home, he set forth 
the needed repairs in particular, and estimated the cost to 
make such repairs at $5,602.31. (Record at 377.) Represen-
tatives of Jensen Bros. even admit to these damages, although 
they contest the cost of repairing them. (Record at 408-410.) 
Nevertheless, the foundation of the Barrington House is not 
"firm and secure", House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d at 204, and 
the resulting damages are substantial. Jensen Bros. is liable 
for those damages even if it had proven that it exercised 
all possible care in constructing the Barrington House. 
Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 922, Chandler v. Bunick, 569 P.2d 
at 1039, Gay v. Cornwall, 494 P.2d 1371, House v. Thornton, 
457 P.2d 199. 
Harward is entitled to recover from Jensen Bros. either 
the difference in value between the house if it had been as 
warranted and as it now is, or the cost of reasonable expend-
itures in putting the house into conformity with the warranty. 
Glisan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260. Consequently, the holding 
of the lower court, that there was no cause of action against 
Jensen Bros., should be reversed and damages in the amount of 
$5,602.31 should be awarded to Harward for repair to the 
Barrington House to put it into conformity with the warranty. 
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v 
JENSEN BROS. COMMITTED FRAUD IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE 
TO HARWARD THAT THE IMPROVEMENTS FOR 
THE SUBDIVISION HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED AND THAT 
THE SUBDIVISION HAD, THEREFORE, NOT BEED ACCEPTED 
BY THE OREM CITY COUNCIL. 
An allegation of fraud ordinarily will not lie unless 
each element thereof has been proven by the aggrieved party. 
Dugan v, Jones, No. 16334 (Utah filed July 23, 1980), Cheever 
v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (.Utah 1978), Pace v. Parrish 
122 Utah 141, 247 P~2d 273 (1952), Stuck v. Delta Land & Water 
Co., 227 P.791, 795 (Utah 1924). 
It may be stated generally that the elements of actual 
fraud exists of: (1) a representation; (2) its fal-
sity; (_3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his in-
tent that it should be acted upon by the person and 
in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance upon its 
truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his conse-
quent and proximate injury. Stuck v. Delta Land & 
Water Co., 227 P. 795 (quoting 26 C~J. 1062). 
Fraud may exist in the suppression of the truth as well as 
in the representation or suggestion of falsehood, however, 
Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (1963). 
Thus, silence, where there is a duty to conununicate material 
matters known by one party, may become actionable fraud. Id., 
Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 212 Kan. 65, 
510 P.2d 198 (1973). 
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he 
knows may justifiably induce the other to act or re-
frain from acting in a business transaction is subject 
to the same liability to the other as though he had 
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he 
has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under 
a duti to the ~ther to exerci;e reasonable care to 
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disclose the matter in questionG RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
TORTS. 
This duty to disclose material facts arises when the 
parties to a transaction share a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 551 (2) (a) I 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). 
The breach of a duty by the dominant party in a con-
fidential relationship may be regarded as constructive 
fraud. It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to show an 
intent to defraud; constructive fraud is an equitable 
doctrine employed by the courts to rectify injury 
resulting from breach of the obligation implicit in 
the relationship. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d at 302. 
A duty to disclose may also exist where a relationship of 
trust exists between the parties or where there is inequality 
of condition and knowledge. Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802. 
A party to a transaction who has sole knowledge or access to 
material facts and knows that such facts are not known or 
reasonably discoverable by the other party is also under a 
duty to disclose them. Goodman v. Kennedy, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 
556 P. 2d 737 (1976). 
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated 
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to 
certain facts is a factor in determining that a duty 
of disclosure is owing. There is abundant authority 
to the effect that if one party to a contract or 
transaction has superior knowledge or knowledge which 
is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the 
other party and which he could not discover by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge 
which are not open to both parties alike, he is under 
a legal obligation to speak, and his silence consti-
tutes fraud, especially when the other party relies 
upon him to communicate to him the true state of facts 
to enable him to judge of the expediency of the bar-
gain or transaction. 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 148. 
Whether there is a duty to disclose must ultimately be 
determined by "reference to all existing circumstances and by 
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comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end 
in view by t~e contracting parties." Elder v. Clawson 384 
P.2d 802, (quoting 23 AM. JUR. 856 Fraud & Deceit §78), 37 
AM. JUR. 2d Fraud & Deceit~ 148. 
When the law imposes the duty on a party to disclose 
matters material to a transaction, he must disclose those 
facts which are known to him or those which could reasonably 
have been known through exercise of reasonable care. Stepanov 
v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979). And a fact is 
material when a reasonable person would attach importance 
to it in determining his choice of action in the transaction 
in question. Timi v. Prescott State Bank, 220 Kan. 377, 553 
P.2d 315 (1976), Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, 
Inc., 510 P.2d 198. 
A party proving fraud may rescind the contract and 
render back what he has received under it, at the same time 
suing for what he has parted with, or he may affirm the 
transaction and maintain an action in deceit. Mecham v. Benson 
590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979). In determining the measure of 
damages, Utah follows the ''benefit of the bargaid' rule: the 
aggrieved party is entitled to the difference between the 
actual value of what he received and the value if it had been 
as represented. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974), 
Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 386, 424 P.2d 136 (1967). 
Harward's claim of fraud against Jensen Bros. arises 
out of the failure by Jensen Bros. to disclose that the 
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improvements for the subdivision in which the Barrington House 
was located had not been accepted by the Orem City Council. 
(Record at 226, lines 16-30 to 227, lines 1-3.) As explained 
at trial by the Orem City Director of Public Works, "The 
street improvements are not accepted until such time as they 
are all installed properly and the final inspections are made." 
(Record at 226, lines 25-27.) 
The improvements in the subdivision where the Barrington 
House is located were not ultimately installed properly and 
accepted until October 15, 1979. (Record at 226, lines 29-30 
to 227, lines 1-3). But after their initial installation, 
the roads, gutters and sidewalks began to deteriorate badly. 
The situation was described by a resident of the subdivisi6n 
who lived three blocks from Harward: 
A ... So just recently things have really looked a lot 
better. But before that, it looked like a war zone. 
Q What do you mean by that? 
A Nothing but decaying streets. A lot of places there 
was no asphalt. Just, it looked like some places 
the streets had never even been put in before they 
were fixed. 
(Record at 253, lines 11-19.) 
Q And the street out front of your house is, you've 
described it as "a war zone," that's the worst in 
the whole subdivision, isn't it? 
A No, I described that it was "a war zone" until things 
were fixed. Now it's a normal street. 
Q Okay. But the problems for the street in front of 
your house were worse than the rest of the subdivi~ 
sion? 
A No. In fact ours was probably one of the better spots 
in the subdivision. 
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Q Whoever put the streets in had problems in putting 
the streets in all over the subdivision, then? 
A I would say, correct. 
(Record at 254, lines 9-20.) 
At times a four wheel drive vehicle was required to get in 
and out of the subdivision. (Record at 376.) Furthermore, 
the sidewalks and gutters needed repairing. (Record at 254, 
lines 28-30.) 
Of the twelve homes on the street where the Barrington 
House is located, seven were for sale at the time of the 
trial. (Record at 307-308.) Yet in the two years prior 
to the trial, only one home on the street had been sold by 
its original owners. (Record at 308.) Harward himself has 
been trying,unsuccessfully at this point, to sell the Barring-
ton House since the summer of 1978. (Record at 307, lines 
10-17.) Largely because of the poor condition of the streets, 
it had been impossible to sell the house prior to October 1979. 
(Record at 367, lines 17-19.) (The slipping foundation makes 
the home almost impossible to sell at the present time.) 
The failure, by Jensen Bros., to disclose that the 
subdivision improvements had not been accepted was a material 
fact. A buyer who knew that the roads, sidewalks, and gutters 
had not been accepted would have been put on notice that 
they might have contained defects. This fact would surely 
have raised questions about the future property values in 
the subdivision and the wisdom of investing in the Barrington 
House. It is self-evident that one seeking to purchase a 
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home will take future property values into account in his 
decision; a home is the largest and most important investment 
most people ever make. They are not likely to make such an 
investment knowing that the road leading to the home is sub-
standard, a possibility for future problems, and a lia-
bility in future attempts to sell the home. 
The nonacceptance of the subdivision's improvements by 
the City of Orem is a fact to which any reasonable person 
would attach importance in determining whether or not to 
purchase the Barrington House. Consequently, it is a material 
fact. Timi v. Prescott State Bank, 553 P.2d 315, Griffith v. 
Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., 510 P.2d 198. 
That the improvements for the subdivision had not been 
accepted by the Orem City Council is a fact which could have 
been known to Jensen Bros. by the exercise of reasonable 
care. Stepanov Ve Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30. It was the 
builder of the house and the party which had to go through 
the preliminary paperwork, such as obtaining building permits, 
prior to construction. Furthermore, Jensen Bros. was connected 
with the Barrington House from the very beginning until its 
sale to Harward. Harward, on the other hand, came upon the 
scene after the home had been completed in a subdivision of 
other homes. In spite of its superior knowledge, Jensen 
Bros. never informed Harward that the subdivision's improve-
ments had not been accepted. {Record at 421, lines 3-15.) 
Because Jensen Bros. knew, or could have known by the 
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exercise of reasonable care, that the improvements had not been 
accepted it could have disclosed this fact to Harward. 
Jensen Bros. had a duty to disclose the non-acceptance 
of the subdivision's improvements because of its superior 
knowledge and because of the inequality of condition between 
the two parties. While Jensen Bros. knew or should have known 
that the subdivision had not been accepted, this fact was 
not reasonably discoverable by Harward. From first outward 
appearances, Harward saw what appeared to be a completed 
subdivision. In fact, representatives of Taylor National 
came to this same conclusion when they first saw the property 
and did not feel the need to make any further investigations 
regarding the matter. (Record a~ 66-69.) Furthermore, the 
defect in the subdivision was not patent to the ordinary 
purchaser. Neither Harward, nor any other buyer, would have 
seen anything to put him on notice that the improvements were 
defective, and had not been accepted. Furthermore, the 
acceptance of an entire subdivision is beyond the normal 
purview of a single individual buying only one house. Jensen 
Brose, on the other hand, had representatives associated with 
the house through the entire period of its planning and 
construction. It was familiar with the subdivision and, 
as a major builder and developer, was familiar with the 
procedures necessary for obtaining approval of the improve-
ments in the subdivision. This superiority of knowledge 
placed a duty on Jensen Bros. to disclose to Harward that the 
subdivision's improvements had not been installed properly, 
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and as a result had not been approved by the Orem City Council. 
Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 
737, 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud & Deceit§ 148. 
It is obvious that Jensen Bros. withheld information about 
the subdivision's improvements in order to induce the sale. 
Had Harward, or any other buyer, known that the roads, sidewalks 
and gutters had not been installed to the satisfaction of the 
City of Orem, he would not have purchased. Jensen Bros. 
had not had any offers for the house which met its expec-
tations before Harward expressed interest, and Jensen Bros. 
was anxious to sell. That the nondisclosure of the infor-
mation about the improvements had the effect of inducing the 
sale is evident by the fact that Harward purchased. 
Harward has been injured as a result of Jensen Bros.' 
-
nondisclosure of material information. The house that cost 
him $140,000 is now worth essentially nothin~ 
Prior to the time that the foundation's 
slippage became readily apparent, (and was not a discourage-
ment to buyers nor of great concern to Harward) , the condi-
tions of the streets and sidewalks made the home unapproachable 
Had the home been without its present defects, it would still 
have been impossible to sell. Now that the problems in the 
roads have been remedied, Harward's house has slipped to a 
degree that it has caused cracks to be obvious to even the 
casual observer. The improper improvements in front of his 
house caused Harward to lose his chance to sell the Barrington 
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House before its other deficiences became apparent to the 
degree that they made the house undesireable. Because of 
this, he has been injured to the extent of $140,000, or the 
difference in the actual value of the Barrington House and 
the value of the house if it had been as it was represented. 
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 
P.2d 136. 
After an examination of all the facts and circumstances, 
it is apparent that Jensen Bros. committed fraud when it 
failed to disclose to Harward that the improvements in the 
subdivision had not been approved by the Orem City Council. 
This case is analogous in many respects to the situation in 
Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802. There, the seller failed 
to disclose the existence of, and economic effect upon the 
operation of the land, of a quarantine due to a noxious weed. 
As a result, Plaintiff, who purchased the land, was prevented 
from using the farm to any material economic advantage. 
Although the buyers knew of the existence of the weed on the 
land, they did not know of the quarantine imposed upon the 
property. As the court said, "There was no occasion for them 
to make an independent investigation of a quarantine of which 
they knew nothing." Id. at 804. 
In the present case, Harward had no reason to know that 
the roads and sidewalks surrounding the Barrington House had 
not been approved by the property city authorities. Conse-
quently, there was no occasion for him to make an independent 
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investigation of the matter. But, their subsequent deterior-
ation caused him to lose the economic benefit of his property 
-- it appears to be impossible to sell the house at the 
present time. The deteriorated roads, like the quarantine 
on the farmland, prevented Harward from realizing the benefit 
of his economic investment. And as in Elder, the party in 
this case with superior knowledge withheld it. The court in 
Elder found that the seller had a duty to disclose the infor-
mation about the quarantine. Likewise, in this case, the 
seller has a duty to disclose what amounts to an economic 
quarantine. Jensen Bros. fraudulently and intentionally 
withheld the facts relating to the nonacceptance of the sub-
division's improvements, which were facts known to it and 
not to Harward. This information was withheld, in spite of 
a duty to the contrary, for the purpose of inducing the sale 
of the Barrington House and had that effect. Consequently, 
Jensen Bros. is liable to Harward for his resulting losso 
The ruling of the trial court, that Harward had no cause of 
action against Jensen Bros., is in error and should be re-
versed with an appropriate award of damages to Harward. 
VI 
JENSEN BROS. IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT IT AGREED TO 
ACCEPT LAND FROM HARWARD IN EXCHANGE FOR EQUITY 
IN THE BARRINGTON HOUSE, AND MAY NOT SEEK TO 
ENFORCE THE TRUST DEED NOTE THROUGH A TRUSTEE'S SALE. 
From the beginning of negotiations over the Barrington 
House, Leon Harward proposed -- and Jensen Bros. accepted --
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an offer to exchange ground for Harward's equity in the house. 
Specifically, the trust deed executed and dated October 28, 
1977 (Exhibit 59) in the amount of $45,600 was to be reduced 
by a trade for other property. At the trial, Jensen Bros. 
claimed that it never agreed to such an arrangement. Rather, 
it sought an order from the court allowing it to enforce the 
terms of the note through a trustee's sale of the Barrington 
House. The court's amended judgment grants Jensen Bros. 
leave to enforce the trust deed note on the grounds that it 
is in default. This judgment is in error and Jensen Bros. 
should be prevented from alleging that it did not agree to 
accept land in exchange for equity in the Barrington House. 
For " ... one may by his acts or conduct away from the court 
prevent himself from denying in court the effect or result 
of those acts." Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 
598, 602 (1970). And the conduct of Jensen Bros. prior to the 
trial indicates that it agreed to accept land in exchange for 
equity. Thus, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
Jensen Bros. is precluded from seeking to enforce the trust 
deed note through a trustee's sale of the Barrington House. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent 
injustice by protecting the individual from loss which he 
could not escape if it were not for the estoppel. Cleveland 
Trust Co. v. State, 555 P.2d 594 (Okla. 1976). "Estoppel 
is a doctrine of equity purposed to rescue from loss a party 
who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action 
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by the wrong or neglect of another." Morgan v. Bd. of State 
Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). In the present case, 
Harward was lead to believe that Jensen Bros. had agreed to 
accept a trade of land for equity in the Barrington House. 
Consequently, he spent much time and effort in showing 
various parcels of land to Jensen Bros. Acting under this 
belief, he also failed to pay any money on the trust deed note 
of October 28, 1977. The doctrine of equitable estoppel 
must be applied in this case to prevent Harward from loss 
due to conduct induced by Jensen Bros. 
The elements of equitable estoppel were recently stated 
by the Utah Court in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). 
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of 
estoppel are: (1) an ~drnission, statement or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) 
action by the other party on the faith of such admis-
sion, statement or act, and (3) injury to such other 
party resulting from allowing the first party to con~ 
tradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. 
602 P.2d at 694. 
In accord with Celebrity Club are Morgan v. Bd. of State 
~----~----·-~--~ - -
Lands, 549 P.2d 695, J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 
534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975), Carnesecca Vo Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 
708 (Utah 1977), Irwin v. Pacific American Life Ins. Co., 10 
Ariz. App. 196, 457 P.2d 736 (1969), Clawson v. Garrison, 3 
Kan. App. 2d 188, 592 P.2d 117 (1979), Rel v. Douglas City 
Civil Serv. Commission, 20 Wash. App. 764, 581 P.2d 1090 (1978), 
City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wash. App. 479, 513 
P.2d 80 (1973). 
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In the instant case, the nature of Harward's injury has 
already been established by the trial court; the trust deed 
note, having been found in default, may be enforced through 
a trustee's sale of the Harward's home. Furthermore, Jensen 
Bros. is granted leave to seek a deficiency judgment against 
Harward for the amount not recovered in the tr~1stee's sale. 
(Amended Judgment, April 15, 1980, at 3-5.) 
That Harward relied on the statements and acts of Jensen 
Bros. is evident. In the first place, he failed to pay any 
money on the trust deed note. Secondly, he expended much 
effort and time in seeking parcels of ground suitable to 
Jensen Bros. He had no reason to do so other than to obtain 
a parcel of land to exchange for the Jensen Bros.' equity. 
in the Barrington House. 
At the trial, Jensen Bros. rejected the assertion that 
it had agreed to accept land in exchange for equity. {Record 
at 386.) This claim is inconsistent with the actions prior 
to the trial of the principals of Jensen Bros., however. 
For representatives of Jensen Bros. indicated their willing-
ness to accept land as a part of the bargain from the begin-
ning. (Record at 264, 387, 390-91.) The disclosure/settle-
ment statement of December 9, 1977, for instance, provides 
for a "Land Trade-in." (Exhibit 36.) On the faith of these 
representations, Harward arranged to meet all the principals 
of Jensen Bros. in early October 1977 in order to show them 
several parcels of ground. (Record at 265.) On that day, he 
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showed them at least three parcels of ground. (Record at 
265-269.) And Harward then spent much time with Leon Jensen 
looking at parcels of land from that October until the spring 
of 1979. (Record at 269-272, 288-89.) Marvin Jensen, too, 
was shown various parcels of land. (Record at 297, 304.) 
Yet there is no evidence to indicate that at any time while 
they were being shown land representatives of Jensen Bros. 
indicated to Harward that they would not accept such land in 
exchange for equity in the Barrington House. In fact, the 
record indicates that representatives of Jensen Bros., through 
express statements, leao Harward to just the opposite conclu-
sion. 
Leon Jensen and Harward discussed various parcels of 
ground, the needs of Jensen Bros., and the kinds of projects 
in which they intended to be involved until as late as March 
1979. (Record at 278.) Furthermore, in March 1979 Harward 
and Leon Jensen discussed an earlier conversation had between 
Harward and Marvin Jensen regarding equity in the house. 
Harward stated that he thought Jensen Bros. still intended 
to buy ground. Leon Jensen responded that he was of that same 
opinion. (Record at 305.) And in June or July of 1978, 
Marvin and Leon Jensen indicated that, while they had never 
refused money for the property, they would be willing to take 
ground. Harward described the conversation: 
I said, "Well, I thought you were going to take ground. " 
They said, "Well, we've never refused to take money. 
We take money and/or ground." And I said, "Well, it 
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was my understanding you were to take ground." 
(Record at 334, lines 10-13.) 
A letter written by Leon Jensen to American Horne Mort-
gage, Inc. in November 1977 further indicates that Jensen 
Bros. had agreed to accept land in exchange for their equity 
in the house. (Exhibit 37.) In pertinent part, that letter 
reads: 
This letter will inform you as to the status of the 
down payment 
We have taken this downpayrnent as equity in land which 
Mr. Harward owns on which we intend to begin develop-
ment work and building in spring of 1978. We are 
satisfied with this arrangement and feel it will 
turn out profitable for us. (Exhibit 37.) 
Statements made at the trial by representatives of Jensen 
Bros. further indicate the agreement of Jensen Bros. to accept 
ground in exchange for equity. Leon Jensen testified: 
A After May of 1978 was there a reason why you -- were 
there reasons why you allowed him to show you pro-
perty? 
A Yes. It was obvious to us and he, I think, very, 
well, I think it was very soon after the Note be-
came due he told me that he just did not have the 
funds to pay the Note off. And the reason why we 
still considered property in exchange is to collect 
somehow on the Note. (Record at 393, lines 25-30; 
to 394, line 1.) (Emphasis added.) 
Jensen Bros. could not still consider property unless it had 
already intended to accept it. And the testimony here indi-
cates that, while it was willing to take money on the trust 
deed note, it had always agreed to accept ground, too. 
Marvin Jensen's testimony also indicates the intention 
by Jensen Bros. to accept land. 
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Q Did you not agree for Jensen Brothers by signing 
Exhibit 38 to accept land for Jensen Brothers' 
equity in the Barrington House? 
A Yes, we did. 
(Record at 413, lines 12-15.) 
Finally, in November 1978, Jensen Bros. entered into an 
earnest money agreement on a parcel procured by Harward. 
The actions and statements of Jensen Bros.' representatives 
regarding the sale of that piece of property (the Williamson 
25 acres) are further evidence that Jensen Bros. agreed to 
accept land. The circumstances surrounding this transaction 
were described by Michael Memmott, who along with Peter Johnson, 
held an option on the property. 
A Well, Leon Harward had come to us with -- had got 
a hold of us indicating to us that he had some 
clients who would be interested in buying some pro-
perty which we had optioned. At that time they had 
made offers to us on two different pieces that were 
in close proximity of each other. They first 
offered on some property 65 acres which we ultimately 
didn't accept, and later offered on 25 acres with 
which we had an option. 
Q Did this dealing have anything to do with Mr. Leon 
Harward's purchase of what is known as Barrington 
House? 
A Yes. That's right. The offer that was made to us 
and accepted is that we accept the trust deed for 
something like $45,000 as part of the settlement 
that the -- or as part of the purchase price~ that 
the Harwards would be paying us for the property. 
(Record at 196, lines 4-18.) 
The earnest money agreement in this sale was introduced 
at the trial as Exhibit 38. Shortly after the execution of 
this instrument, Marvin Jensen sent a letter to Harward 
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outlining the transaction. (Exhibit 55.) That letter 
confirms the fact that Jensen Bros. had agreed to accept 
land in trade for equity and reads in pertinent part: 
According to our earnest money agreement for the south 
25 acres from Williamsons, and per our several verbal 
agreements, your note to us of $46,500.00 will be assumed 
by Johnson and Memmott and become our equity down pay-
ment in the property. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
The arrangements to include your note in this 
deal on Williamson's property should be of benefit to 
both of us. It is, as you know, because of these 
negotiations that we have held off on our foreclosure 
of your home. (Exhibit 55.) 
The application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
is determined by an objective test, according to what a 
reasonable person might have concluded under the circumstances. 
Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 197/). As 
the court said in Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 417, 
513 P.2d 417 (1973) I 
The determination of such an issue is not dependent 
on the asserted subjective content of the mind of the 
person claiming he was misled. The test to be applied 
is an objective one as to what a reasonable and prudent 
person in the circumstances might conclude ... 513 P.2d 
at 420. 
A reasonably prudent person in Harward's situation would 
have come to the same conclusion he did: Jensen Bros. lead 
him to believe that it would accept land in exchange for 
equity by participating in the search for property. Repre-
sentatives of Jensen Bros. were aware that he was committed 
to finding property in exchange for the equity in the house. 
Rather than telling him that they would not accept property, 
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they traveled to various sites to view proposed property and 
discussed the possibility of puchasing property for over a year. 
A reasonable person would conclude that these actions were 
motivated by an intent to accept the agreement to exchange land 
for equity. 
By its conduct and assertions, Jensen Bros. knowingly lead 
Harward to seek land rather than pay money in exchange for equi-
ty in the property. Harward's actions were reasonable and will 
result in injury or detriment to him if Jensen Bros. is allowed 
to repudiate or deny its conduct. These facts have been esta-
blished by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, Jensen 
Bros. is equitably estopped from seeking a trustee's sale on 
the trust deed note, and the judgment of the lower court is in 
error and should be overturned. 
VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REFORM THE TRUST 
DEED NOTE BETWEEN HARWARD AND JENSEN BROS. TO CO~FORM 
TO THEIR AGREE:MENT TO TRADE LAND 
WORTH $45,600 IN EXCHANGE FOR JENSEN BROS.' EQUITY 
IN THE BARRINGTON HOUSE. 
Harward seeks reformation of the trust deed note in this 
case to reflect the terms of the agreement entered into between 
himself and Jensen Bros. 
Reformation is an equitable remedy. Kesler v. Rogers, 
542 P.2d 355 (Utah 1975). 
The province of .refo:mation is t~ make a writing ex-
press the bargain which the parties desired to put in 
writing. Reformation of a writing is justified when 
the parties have come to a complete mutual understanding 
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of all the essential terms of their bargain, but by reason 
of mutual mistake, or its equivalent, tne written . 
agreement is not in conformity with such understanding 
in a material matter. Durkee v. Busk, 355 P.2d 588, 
591 (Alaska 1960). 
Before a contract can be reformed, then, there must have been 
a prior meeting of the minds as to the terms of the writing. 
Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 769 (Utah 1951). 
The conditions which must be established in order to 
reform a written contract were set out by the court in Jensen 
v. Miller, 280 Or. 225, 570 P.2d 375 (1977). 
The parties seeking reformation of a written contract 
must establish, by the appropriate quantum of proof, 
{l) that there was an antecedent agreement to which 
the contract can be reformed~ (2) that there was a 
mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake on the part of 
the party seeking reformation arid inequitable conduct 
on the part of the other party; and (3) that the party 
seeking reformation was not guilty of gross negligence. 
570 P.2d at 377. 
Mutual mistake occurs when "both parties to a contract have 
an identical intention as to the terms to be embodied in the 
proposed contract, and the writing executed by them is rnateri-
ally at variance with such intention." Keesling v. Pehling, 
214 P.2d 506 (Wash. 1950). The fault sought to be corrected 
by reformation is that the executed written instrument does 
not reflect the true understanding of the parties. Voyta v. 
Clonts, 328 P.2d 655 (Mont. 1958). 
In the instant case, there is either mutual mistake in 
reducing the agreement between Harward and Jensen Bros. to 
writing, or unilateral mistake by Harward accompanied by 
inequitable conduct on the part of Jensen Bros. For as pre-
viously established, Jensen Bros. represented that it would 
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take ground in exchange for its equity in the Barrington 
House. This was also the understanding of Harward. 
However, the writing does not clearly establish this fact. 
If the parties mutually agreed to this term, then the 
writing was materially at variance with their intention. 
And if Jensen Bros. secretly harbored an intention not to 
perform according to this term of the contract, then it 
is guilty of inequitable conduct in encouraging Harward 
to proceed under the false apprehension that he need not 
pay money, but could proceed to expend time and effort in 
procuring land for Jensen Bros. Harward cannot be said to 
be guilty of gross negligence. He was in continual communi-
cation with representatives of Jensen Bros. and remained 
under the impression that they would accept land because 
of their repeated representations and conduct. He is, 
therefore, entitled to reformation of the trust deed note 
to reflect the terms of the agreement as entered into 
with Jensen Bros. The trial court erred when it failed to 
reform the writing to reflect the original intent of the 
parties. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
district court should be reversed or in the alternative 
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a new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. William Bradford 
Attorney for Appellant 
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